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Regime for Broadband Applications
William D. Rahmt
This Article proposes a "substantive equality" solution for managing
access to the Internet for broadband applications. It argues that the currently-
proposed solutions, self-regulation and 'formal equality, " either afford too
much power to broadband operators or are inefficient. The model proposed in
this Article accepts that the market is superior to administrative agencies when
it comes to choosing which applications deserve priority on the network. Since
there can be market failures, however, the Article lays out an adjudicatory
enforcement mechanism to evaluate charges of harmful conduct. The
adjudication would involve the application of a two-factor test for deciding
which party should bear the burden of proof on the question offairness. This
method seeks to bring predictability to application developers concerned about
obtaining access, while minimizing regulatory costs to network owners.
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Introduction
While traveling in Tennessee on business, Doug Herring kept calling his
wife but the phone calls to their home in Elberta, Alabama wouldn't go
through. The Herrings had switched to Vonage's broadband voice service a
month earlier, but they had never experienced any problems. Soon Mr. Herring
discovered the culprit. His broadband provider, a unit of Madison River
Communications, had blocked the Vonage application because it competed
with Madison River's phone service-a natural monopoly that today charges
four times as much for a similar product.' Unwilling to see all its profitable
voice customers migrate to Vonage and unable to compete with that service's
value, Madison River simply took it off the table by denying Vonage access to
its customers.
2
Those who say the Internet has no gatekeeper have never heard of the
Madison River case. Every time someone sends or receives an email or
1 The Herrings used Vonage which offers unlimited local and long-distance service for
$24.99/month. See Vonage website at http://www.vonage.com (last visited Apr. 9, 2006). Gulfrel, the
division of Madison River Communications that serves the Herrings' hometown of Elberta, AL,
advertises equivalent service for $115+/month: unlimited local service for $26.07/month and unlimited
long-distance for $90.92/month. See Gulifel's website at
http://www.gulftelephone.com/hservices/index.php (last visited Apr. 9, 2006).
2 This description of Doug Herring and Madison River Communications was adapted from
Amy Schatz & Anne Marie Squeo, Neutral Ground: As Web Providers' Clout Grows, Fears Over
Access Take Focus, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 2005, at Al.
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accesses a web page, the data transmission passes through a private company's
infrastructure. That those companies have chosen to leave the gates largely
open is due partly to past regulatory policy, somewhat to economic incentives
and technology, and perhaps as much to the absence of acute congestion on the
Internet. As more applications compete for access, including those affiliated
with network owners, the gatekeeping power of operators is enhanced. They
must choose whom to favor and whom to disadvantage. These choices will
influence investment and innovation throughout the economy.
Many credit the openness of the Internet for its explosive growth as a
platform for economic activity and free expression.3 Unlike print, radio or
television, this technology allows seemingly anyone to communicate and
transact globally. In the original, narrowband world, the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC or "the Commission") reinforced this
openness by imposing the existing regulatory framework for
telecommunications. Specifically, "common carriage" policies prevented
telephone companies from discriminating against data traveling over their
pipes.4
The emergence of broadband amplified the Internet's benefits and also
increased power for network operators. 5 The FCC granted broadband an
exemption from common carriage requirements, essentially opening the door
for operators to exert more authority as gatekeepers. 6 And the Supreme Court
officially upheld this FCC position in National Cable & Telecommunications
Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Services,7 granting Chevron deference 8 to the
3 See, e.g., S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation: Hearing on "Network
Neutrality", 109th Congress (2006) (statement of Vinton Cerf, Chief Internet Evangelist, Google Inc.).
Cerf claimed that "[t]he remarkable success of the Internet can be traced to a few simple network
principles-end-to-end design, layered architecture, and open standards." Others contend that this
"openness" was an "unintended side effect of the military objectives (preservation of communication
during nuclear attack) of the Intemet's original Department of Defense sponsors." Bruce M. Owen &
Gregory L. Rosston, Local Broadband Access: Primum Non Norcere or Primum Processi? A Property
Rights Approach 21 (Progress & Freedom Foundation Conference on Net Neutrality, SIEPR Discussion
Paper No. 02-37, July 2003), available at http://siepr.stanford.edu/papers/pdf/02-37.pdf (hereinafter
Local Broadband Access).
4 Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 251 (2000).
5 Although "broadband" is defined differently by various parties, the FCC currently states that
broadband consists of "services and facilities with an upstream (customer-to-provider) and downstream
(provider-to-customer) transmission speed of 200 [kilobits per second] or greater." Availability of
Advanced Telecommunications Capability in the United States, GN Docket No. 04-54 (released Sept. 9,
2004), 19 F.C.C.R. 20,540, 2004 FCC LEXIS 5157, at *6. Throughout the Article the term "platform
operator" will be used interchangeably with "broadband firm," "broadband service provider" (BSP) and
"network operator."
6 See, e.g., Jerry A. Hausman, J. Gregory Sidak & Hal J. Singer, Cable Modems and DSL:
Broadband Internet Access for Residential Customers, 91 AM. ECON. REv. 302, 303-04 (2001).
7 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
8 Under general principles of administrative law, courts will customarily defer to an
administrative agency's reasonable interpretation of a statute if the statute is silent or unclear on the
subject. This principle is referred to as "Chevron deference," named for the court case in which it was
first articulated. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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agency's interpretation of the 1996 Telecom Act without taking a position on
the wisdom of the policy.
9
Today, therefore, network operators are well-positioned to exert
tremendous influence as Internet gatekeepers. Technological convergence
wrought by broadband, which allows previously disparate media to traverse the
same network, further empowers network owners to impact multiple industries
and regulatory structures.' 0 At least two forms of harm could develop from
flawed management of the network. First, consumers could lose access to
valuable services." Operators might advantage their own broadband services or
simply protect legacy products that are threatened by broadband substitutes,
even if these services are less valuable to consumers than independent
offerings. Second, innovation in applications may be deterred. By
discriminating against certain applications, operators will discourage
investment in these services.
12
"Network neutrality" has become the catch phrase for a new regime
proposed to regulate access for broadband applications. On both sides of the
debate, big businesses have lined up to do battle. On one side, cable and
telephone companies favor self-regulation, an unrestrained market solution.'
3
Commentators supporting this position argue that the Madison River case was
an anomaly and further contend that the costs of regulation would exceed the
potential for harm from self-regulation.14 They claim that the market is the best
9 Indeed, the Court recognized that the FCC's decision not to designate broadband a
"telecommunications service" amounted to a change in the FCC's interpretation of that term but rejected
the argument that agency inconsistency is a basis for declining application of Chevron, 468 U.S. at
2699-2700.
10 See Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Access to Networks: Economic and
Constitutional Connections, 88 CORNTELL L. REV. 885, 889 (2003) (noting that technological
convergence "has begun to put pressure on the historical regulatory distinction among voice, video, and
data communications").
11 Inferior access is simply a less extreme, and perhaps more prevalent, form of this harm.
While consumers will notice if an application is totally unavailable to them, they may be less aware of
their broadband provider's conduct when an application has simply been slowed. Indeed, they may
blame the performance problems on the application firm even though the source of the issue is the
network delivery.
12 Other harms are also possible, specifically where operators limit the ability of users to
interact with each other for commercial or expressive purposes. This may occur if network owners
clamp down on bandwidth-heavy "peer-to-peer" activity or restrict user-created content or services, such
as blogs. While this Article does address commercial activity by users, which is often indistinguishable
from services provided by corporate entities, it does not focus on the lost consumer utility from a
reduction of free association and free expression. Although such utility loss is nontrivial, these harms are
difficult to measure relative to efficiency losses. It is worth noting, however, that the legal mechanism
proposed by this Article might still protect such behavior against unfair operator restrictions.
13 See, e.g., Letter from the National Cable & Telecommunications Association (NCTA) to
the FCC (Sept. 8, 2003) (on file with author); Adam D. Thierer, "Net Neutrality": Digital
Discrimination or Regulatory Gamesmanship in Cyberspace?, POLICY ANALYSIS (Cato Inst.,
Washington, D.C.), Jan. 12, 2004, at 1. Brian Roberts, CEO of Comcast, speaking on a quarterly
conference call, stated, "[net neutrality] is a regulation of the Internet, and we're certainly going to try to
fight anything like that." Comcast Corporation Q4 2005 Earnings Conference Call Transcript (Feb. 2,
2006), available at http://intemetstockblog.com/article/6476 (last visited Apr. 26, 2006).
14 See Thierer, supra note 13.
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mechanism for deciding how to treat applications-whether to restrict some,
grant others priority and charge for fast delivery. Moreover, they insist that any
limitation on the operators' ability to offer their own applications and manage
their own network discourages further investment in broadband infrastructure,
and may even violate their constitutional property and free speech rights.'
5
On the other side, web and software firms want to disable the gatekeeping
power of broadband firms. They propose that the FCC issue rules requiring
operators to treat all applications alike.16 They aspire to a system that does not
distinguish among applications or attachments, similar to the electricity system
or the regulatory framework of common carriage governing traditional
telecommunications services. 17 Such a regime, in its strongest form, would
prohibit broadband firms from placing any restrictions on data traveling
through the pipes.' 8 Advocates of this "behavioral" approach argue that
innovation among applications demands harsh limits on the ability of operators
to advantage their own services at the expense of others.' 9 Although the FCC
has tacitly endorsed the premise that maintaining such access for broadband
applications is important, it has stopped short of issuing rules in explicit
support of this concept.
20
Resolution of this debate requires consideration of two interrelated
goals:21 maintaining incentives for firms to invest in network build-out and
protecting innovation in applications. An inherent tension exists as applications
and operators both struggle for greater power over the network. Operators want
to maximize the value of their assets by controlling access to users while
application developers seek unimpeded access to the same end users. But this
tension is not irresolvable. New applications both generate their own value and
contribute to the value of the infrastructure by acting as complements since
users' willingness to pay for broadband access is a function of the applications
15 Id. at 16-17 (discussing property rights and the Fifth Amendment); Christopher S. Yoo,
Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2005) (discussing the First Amendment).
16 See Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 141 (2003).
17 See Letter from Tim Wu, Associate Professor, University of Virginia School of Law, &
Lawrence Lessig, Professor of Law, Stanford Law School, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, 8-9
(Aug. 22, 2003), available at http://www.faculty.virginia.edu/timwu/wulessigfcc.pdf.
18 Id.
19 A "behavioral" approach addresses the conduct of an operator in contrast to a "structural"
solution which might prevent network owners from integrating into adjacent markets where they will
compete with other independent application providers. See Barbara van Schewick, Towards an
Economic Framework for Network Neutrality Regulation, 5 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L.
(forthcoming 2007), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=812991.
20 See FCC, ESTABLISHMENT OF AN APPROPRIATE FRAMEWORK FOR BROADBAND ACCESS TO
THE INTERNET OVER WIRELINE FACILITIES (2005).
21 For an example of this debate, see generally Thomas Tauke et al., Net Neutrality and Net
Neutering in a Post-Brand X World: Self Regulation, Policy, Principles and Legal Mandates in the
Broadband Marketplace, PROGRESS ON POINT (Progress & Freedom Found., Washington, D.C.) Dec.
2005.
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available to them.22 Policymakers have the opportunity to strike the right
balance of encouraging development of new applications while maintaining
strong incentives for infrastructure investment.
Ultimately, Congress must decide how to design such a policy. As an
"information economy," where success depends on knowledge increasingly
gained from online media, the United States cannot forsake either applications
or operators. 23 Today, the United States has fallen behind other countries in the
availability of broadband service, ranking twelfth globally.24 Pursuing universal
adoption of broadband is essential not only to our continued economic growth
but also to bridging social inequality.25 Democracy requires policing Internet
gatekeepers as broadband becomes the predominant vehicle for educating
voters. 26 Currently, Congress is holding hearings and debating drafts of a bill to
update the 1996 Telecommunications Act.27 It should take this opportunity to
articulate how to achieve a level playing field for broadband applications.
This Article offers Congress an alternative regime, distinct from either
self-regulation or network neutrality. Starting from the premise that true
equality among applications requires differential treatment, this model endorses
a substantive equality principle as the governing legal standard. This approach
22 This is a classic two-sided network, described in more detail in Part II. For a detailed
understanding of the legal and economic implications of two-sided networks see David S. Evans, The
Antitrust Economics of Two-Sided Markets (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regulatory Studies, Related
Publication No. 02-13, Sept. 2002); see also Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Two-Sided Markets: An
Overview (2004), available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/filelegacydocs/ep rochetover.pdf; van
Schewick, supra note 19, at 37 (arguing that "new applications trigger new advances in the [Intemet]
itself; these advances may in turn spawn the adoption of the [Internet] in additional sectors of the
economy or may lead to new or improved applications in sectors that already use the technology").
23 See President William Jefferson Clinton, State of the Union Address (Jan. 23, 1996)
("[One] hundred years ago we moved from farm to factory. Now we move to an age of technology,
information and global competition."), available at http://clinton2.nara.gov/WH/New/other/sotu.html
(last visited Apr. 23, 2006). See also, William E. Kennard, Commencement Address at Howard
University (May 13, 2000) ("1 believe that ensuring all Americans have access to technology is the civil
rights challenge of this new millennium."), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Kennard/2000/spwek0l 2.html.
24 See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), OECD Broadband
Statistics (Dec. 2005), http://www.oecd.org/document/39/0,2340,en_2649_34225_3645943-
1 1_1 1_1,00.html.
25 See Leila Abboud, U.S. Lags Behind in High-Speed Internet Access, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12,
2006, at B2. Broadband networks are vital to the information technology and communications sectors,
which represent nearly 10% of the nation's economy and are growing more than five times as fast as the
overall economy. See ECON. & STAT. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, DIGITAL ECONOMY 2002, 25-
27 (Feb. 2002), available at https://www.esa.doc.gov/reports/DE2002rl.pdf For more information, see
Reed Hundt, YOU SAY YOU WANT A REVOLUTION: A STORY OF INFORMATION AGE POLITICS (2000).
From a democratic perspective, the correlation between broadband usage and race is especially
troubling. Fortunately, there is evidence that the difference in usage between whites and minorities (the
so-called "digital divide") has narrowed considerably between 1998 and 2006. Michel Marriott, Blacks
Turn to Internet Highway and Digital Divide Starts to Close, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2006, at Al.
26 See Adam Nagourney, Internet Injects Sweeping Change into U.S. Politics, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 2, 2006, at Al; see also, Adam Cohen, Why the Democratic Ethic of the World Wide Web May Be
About to End, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2006, at D9.
27 See Anne Broache, Broadband Law Rewrite Planned for 2006,
http://news.com.com/Broadband+law+rewrite+planned+for+2006/2100-1028_3-6036677.html
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accepts that the market is better than administrative agencies at choosing which
applications deserve priority. But it also acknowledges that market failures do
exist and so a legal principle without an enforcement mechanism will prove
inadequate. Therefore, it proposes ex post adjudication to evaluate charges of
harmful conduct by broadband operators. Grounded by a two-factor test for
deciding which party should bear the burden of proof, this method seeks to
bring predictability to application developers concerned about obtaining access
while minimizing the regulatory costs to network owners.
Part I introduces the business and legal landscape upon which any law
must operate. First, it describes the industry structure. Technological and
competitive forces as well as the presence of state regulatory bodies impact
federal regulation in this field. Second, it highlights the key economic concepts
that influence the behavior of the relevant actors. Economic theory suggests
that, subject to exceptions, an operator may not have any incentive to
discriminate against independent applications, even as it vertically integrates
into competitive services. In addition, the ability of users to impose congestion
costs on other users constitutes an externality that produces inefficiencies.
Third, Part I discusses the constitutional constraints and broader legal
background which will shape the choice of policy.
Part II analyzes the two popular models to manage access for broadband
applications-a self-regulation approach and a network neutrality regime. The
self-regulation response arises from the principle that the market, left
unrestrained, will sort out questions of broadband access in the most efficient
manner possible. This position attributes the absence of significant anti-
competitive behavior in the past to strong economic forces preventing such
conduct. The introduction of new services and technology, however, may both
enable and encourage network operators to discriminate against unaffiliated
content, especially if they possess market power over consumers. The
significant direct costs that operators may impose through exclusion of certain
applications-namely, raising the price and availability of services-as well as
the indirect costs of stifled innovation suggest that self-regulation is inadequate.
Network neutrality proposals endorse a formal equality approach to
access, forcing networks to treat all applications exactly alike. Various network
neutrality proposals all tend to anticipate a policy that is executed through
rulemaking. Not only are the regulatory costs of rulemaking in this context
substantial, but the underlying principle of formal equality does not fit well
with heterogeneous applications and congested networks. By prohibiting any
priority among applications, network neutrality implicitly favors those services
that are not affected by time delays. Thus, this regime replaces one market
failure with new market distortions that may reduce incentives for investment
in certain applications, as well as in broadband.
Finally, Part III develops the substantive equality regime. First, it calls for
Congress to codify a substantive equality principle to govern operators'
treatment of broadband applications seeking access to the network. Since such
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applications are not all alike, formal equality is inadequate for achieving
substantively equal treatment. Recognizing that the market generally is better
suited for sorting out the appropriate treatment for a specific application, this
model permits operators to choose, in the first instance, how to treat
applications. To enforce the legal principle of equality, the statute instructs the
FCC to issue disclosure rules forcing transparency regarding operators' choices
for differential treatment and grants jurisdiction for the Commission to hear
complaints of unfair conduct. In order to provide further predictability to the
resolution of such matters, the law should direct judges to employ a two-factor
test to decide which party should bear the burden of proof. If the plaintiff can
show that the operator has market power and did not use a fair method for
choosing which applications to prioritize or disfavor, the operator will be
forced to overcome a presumption of harm by demonstrating that it still
satisfied the law's substantive equality principle. If the plaintiff cannot make
this showing, the operator will receive a presumption of legal conduct that must
be overcome by the plaintiff in a fact-based inquiry. This method of
implementing the legal standard avoids the problems associated with
rulemaking while providing a mechanism for the federal government or private
parties to challenge what they consider harmful treatment.
I. The Landscape Faced by Legislators
A. Internet Technology: A Multi-Layered Group of Networks
The Internet is comprised of several layers built on top of a physical
platform that is itself a network of networks. As Figure 1 indicates, networks
may be separated into four horizontal layers and the ability to reduce all media
(data, voice and video) into a standard code enables them to all travel over the
28same physical infrastructure. Distinct entities may operate in each of these
layers, but network operators have increasingly extended their presence
forward from the physical layer to applications/content. 29
28 Traditionally, each medium was delivered through a separate infrastructure. For example,
coaxial cable and broadcast signals provided video service. Voice calls were transmitted over copper
telephone lines. The logical layer essentially enables all media to travel as standardized data. Network
devices translate data, voice or video into packets of binary code that permit computer-to-computer
communication without identifying the type of media. The packets are then reassembled into data, voice
or video.




The physical layer is itself divisible into three network components,
according to the FCC.3 1  Backbone providers facilitate long-distance
connections between a small number of interconnection points. Middle-mile
providers carry data from these interconnection points to distribution facilities.
And last-mile providers convey the traffic from these facilities to end users.
The networks discussed in this Article are the last-mile (or local) networks
because they represent the connection point between users and all the services
available through the Internet.
While some scholars have compared broadband networks to electric
utilities,32 such a comparison is not as much a description of today's situation
as it is an aspiration of those seeking to limit the gatekeeping power of
30 The application and content layer can be understood as a single top layer for the purposes
of analyzing broadband networks and their owners' forward integration. Thus, in this Article, the term
"applications" should be understood to include content. See generally Lawrence Lessig, The Internet
Under Siege, FOREIGN POL'Y, Nov./Dec. 2001, at 56, 59-60.
31 See Inquiry Considering the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to
All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment
Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Second Report, 15 F.C.C.R. 20,913,
20,923-28 (2000).
32 See Owen & Rosston, supra note 3, at 14.
Figure 1: Layers of Broadband Architecture30
CONTENT LAYER
(e.g., individual email, phone call, or webpage)
Sample Firms: Amazon, Google, eBay
APPLICATIONS LAYER
(e.g., web browser, email, VolP, IPTV)
Sample Firms: Netscape, Vonage, RealPlayer
LOGICAL LAYER
(e.g., TCP/IP, domain name system, telephone
number system)
PHYSICAL LAYER
(e.g., fiber optics, telephone lines, coaxial cable)
Sample Firms: Comcast, Verizon, Level III
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operators. First, electronic applications tend to be homogeneous and static in
the sense that there has been little differentiation in the way electronics access
the electric grid, while broadband applications are constantly developing and
may require time-sensitive or standard delivery. 33 This distinction alone belies
any sincere attempt to analogize broadband and electricity networks. In
addition, electric utilities are so heavily regulated, at both the state and federal
level, that it is difficult to equate the two industries.34 Finally, electric utilities
have very little information about, or control over, the last-mile of their
distribution networks. Whether this resulted from design or regulation is less
important than the fact that today electric utilities do not possess the same
functionality as a broadband operator.
Broadband networks, by contrast, are designed to allow their owners to
discriminate in the applications traveling through their pipes. 35 One writer
explained that "Cisco ... [has] developed 'policy-based routers' that enable
[broadband] companies to choose which content flows quickly and which flows
slowly. ' 36 Such technology gives these broadband companies power more
analogous perhaps to a cable television operator who can control its
subscribers' access and content. This analogy to cable television does not work
well because of the diversity of applications competing for access on
broadband networks, but it does underscore that operators are gatekeepers, a
key distinction between broadband and many other networked businesses.
37
B. Broadband Industry Structure: A Competition Among "Natural"
Monopolies
Concentration in the market for broadband access is the most important
feature of the industry structure. Concerns about anti-competitive conduct by
vertically-integrated firms are heightened when those firms possess monopoly
power in the primary market. 38 In other words, vibrant competition in the
market for high-speed local broadband access would substantially mitigate any
33 Owen and Rosston point out that competition among electric utilities resulted in the
development of a standard that electronics must now meet in order to get access to the electric grid. Id.
at 15.
34 One must distinguish the broadband businesses from the other entities owned by cable and
telephone companies. These units, as the article discusses, have traditionally been regulated as natural
monopolies similar in some ways to electric utilities.
35 Although some find the term "discrimination" too harsh, it is not meant to invoke
pejorative connotations. See, e.g., Thierer, supra note 13, at 2. Whether well-intentioned or not, an
operator's differential treatment of content constitutes discrimination.
36 Lessig, supra note 30, at 62.
37 In addition to electric utilities, such networked businesses include roadways, water systems
and gas pipelines. While some level of control exists in each of these, none are able to easily monitor
and restrict access for attachments or applications.
38 Some observers believe that network operators may have the ability and incentive to
discriminate even in a competitive marketplace. Barbara van Schewick, for example, argues that
switching costs are sufficiently high for consumers that a network operator may engage in harmful
behavior even when alternative providers exist. See van Schewick, supra note 19.
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concerns that the network owners might unfairly compete with search engines,
email services, or other application-level providers. Indeed, many scholars have
argued that a monopoly in the primary market is a structural precondition for
harmful conduct by a vertically integrated firm in an adjacent market. 39
Ultimately, if consumers have many choices and switching costs are low, there
is confidence that the market will punish harmful conduct by broadband
firms.
40
The leading broadband technologies, cable modem service and digital
subscriber line technology (DSL), emerged out of natural monopolies. A
natural monopoly exists if a single firm can supply the entire market at a lower
cost than two or more firms.4 1 Although some disagreement remains over
whether cable networks and local telephone service are natural monopolies,
42
they have long served as quintessential examples of such. Intuitively, the
state-protected access to individual households that these firms have gained
appears to provide a substantial advantage against new competition. Thus,
when cable and telecommunications firms began offering broadband services,
they did so from a strong competitive position relative to other technologies,
for example wireless or fiber optics. And although some may claim that the
field is wide open, it is difficult to deny the significant head start these products
received.43
Unsurprisingly, these two technologies dominate the market for
broadband, together representing 93% of all broadband subscribers nationally.44
Moreover, as extensions of natural monopolies there is no intra-technology
competition, e.g., only one cable modem service provider exists in a city
because only one cable company owns the local franchise. Despite the
historical monopoly position enjoyed by firms offering cable broadband and
DSL, some commentators still insist that the "existence of a natural monopoly
does not necessarily preclude competitive entry ... so long as entry and exit are
39 For a discussion of the Chicago School's "leverage theory," see Christopher S. Yoo,
Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New Economy, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 188-91
(2002).
40 While this Article does not fully explore the effect of switching costs, this is an area for
further inquiry. If switching costs are high, an operator with relatively limited market share may still
exercise significant power because these costs pose barriers to exit for consumers.
41 The concept is generally credited to John Stuart Mill. See JOHN STUART MILL, 2
PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 142 (J.A. Hill & Co. 1904) (1848).
42 The electric grid offers another common example of a natural monopoly. Broadband over
powerlines seeks to leverage this infrastructure into a broadband access service. For a review of the
major studies on this issue of natural monopolies, see Spulber & Yoo, supra note 10, at 917 n. 99.
43 For opponents of this view, see Thierer, supra note 13, at I (claiming that the market is a
"competitive free-for-all").
44 See FCC, Federal Communications Commission Releases Data on High-Speed Services for
Internet Access, 2005 WL 1585609 (July 7, 2005) (stating that during the year 2004, broadband lines
increased to 37.9 million, comprised of 13.8 million DSL lines, 21.4 million cable lines, 2.7 million
other (satellite or wireless)).
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easy . . . 45 But the absence of new entrants into cable TV or local telephone
service supports the logic that sunk costs provide a barrier to entry.
The degree of concentration depends, in part, on whether one measures at
the local or national level. Recent consolidation among telecom (e.g., AT&T
and BellSouth) and cable companies (e.g., Comcast and Adelphia) may render
this distinction moot because we are left with only a few large players in any
one community and across the nation. Still, antitrust analysis places significant
weight on defining the geographic market and since the underlying platform is
two-sided there is some basis for both a local and national framework. A
leading advocate for a national perspective, Professor Christopher S. Yoo,
argues that "network neutrality proposals are designed to limit the exercise of
market power not [against] end users, but rather [where] last-mile providers
meet ISPs and content/application providers. 46 Thus, Yoo believes a national
market makes more sense because web companies, for example Google, are
focused on access to customers in the aggregate, and not just in a specific
47region. On the other hand, a local definition of the market may make more
sense since the harm at issue focuses on operators discriminating against what
application reach end users. This matter is substantially mitigated if users can
respond to unfair treatment by replacing their broadband providers, but cases
like that of Madison River do not seem less problematic simply because
services like Vonage can find customers in other states. Today, the FCC defines
the market locally and this Article proceeds from that premise.
48
Using this local perspective, the market for last-mile broadband access
appears highly concentrated on average. One metric in modem competition
policy is the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI). HHI is calculated by adding
the square of the market share of each competitor, where a total monopoly
results in 10,000 (100%A2) and infinite fragmentation yields a score of 0
(0%A2). 49 The DOJ Guidelines indicate that antitrust authorities are unlikely to
45 Spulber & Yoo, supra note 10, at 918. These authors also cite to Richard Posner's claim
that nonrecurring costs of entry are "irrelevant if there are small firms in the market that can grow to be
large firms." RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 92 (1976). State
licensing, however, would seem to prevent small firms from existing alongside these natural
monopolies.
46 Christopher S. Yoo, Would Mandating Broadband Network Neutrality Help or Hurt
Competition? A Comment on the End-to-End Debate, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 23, 51
(2004).
47 See Yoo, supra note 39, at 253-54.
48 See In the Matter of Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Facilitate the Provision of
Fixed and Mobile Broadband Access, Educational and Other Advanced Services in the 2150-2162 and
2500-2690 MHz Bands, WT Docket No. 03-6618 (released Apr. 2, 2003), 18 F.C.C.R. 6722, 6774-75
123-24 (2003); see also van Schewick, supra note 19, at 4 n.15 ("The relevant geographic markets for
residential high-speed Internet access services are local. That is, a consumer's choices are limited to
those companies that offer high-speed Internet access services in his or her area, and the only way to
obtain different choices is to move.").
49 For example, a market of four firms with market shares of 30%, 30%, 20% and 20%,
respectively, would have an HHI of 900 + 900 + 400 + 400 = 2600.
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challenge a vertical merger unless HHI exceeds 1800 in the primary market.
50
Such a score results from five to six competitors of equal size. Since local
markets are typically dominated by two players-the original natural
monopolies of cable and telecommunications-defining the market locally
yields HHIs often above 5000.51 Even using Yoo's proposed national view,
there is a high level of concentration among telecommunications and cable
52
companies which has only increased during the last ten years.
Many point to new technologies as likely to reshape the broadband
industry.53 Although wireless, satellite and powerline technologies have seized
some market share in recent years, claims of a "competitive free-for-all" seem
overblown. 54 Significant technological, economic and regulatory barriers limit
the mass-adoption and full-scale competition of these rival services. Satellite
has traditionally been a one-way transmission, i.e., broadcasting from a central
point to dishes on people's homes but not the other way. Additional technology
would need to be deployed, essentially a new network, to facilitate interactive
satellite communications. The most robust wireless technologies are not yet
cheap enough to compete against cable and DSL. WiMax, for example, may
cover a large footprint with significant capacity (e.g., 50 Mbps over a 5 mile
radius) where each dish costs perhaps five thousand dollars. The problem is
that providing enough capacity for each user at peak time in a populated area
would require blanketing the geography with dishes which would increase the
capital cost per user to prohibitive levels.55 Finally, broadband over powerlines
(BPL) exhibits many of the advantages of cable and DSL-primarily, universal
reach and leveraging a natural monopoly's infrastructure-but obstacles
remain. Since the electric distribution industry is considerably more fragmented
than cable or local voice, BPL providers (usually independent firms) must
negotiate with dozens of utilities in order to establish a sizeable footprint.
Absent a federal order preempting state regulators in this field, BPL firms must
50 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES, §§ 4.131, 4.212, 49 Fed. Reg.
26,823 (1984), [hereinafter Guidelines] (requiring that the relevant markets be concentrated).
51 For example, a market with a cable company claiming 60% of the high-speed market and
the telco possessing 40% would result in 3600 + 1600 = 5200 HHI.
52 See Eli M. Noam, Deregulation and Market Concentration: An Analysis of Post-1996
Consolidations, 3 FED. COMM. L.J. 539, 543 (2006).
53 See Thierer, supra note 13, at 14.
54 Id. at 1 ("[T]he broadband marketplace... is very much a competitive free-for-all, and no
one has any idea what the future market will look like with so many new technologies and operators
entering the picture.").
55 Take Nassau County, a heavily populated suburban area in Long Island, NY: According to
the U.S. Census, 460,000 households occupy an area of 287 square miles. If a WiMax broadband
operator cared only about covering the area with devices that have a radius of five miles, he might only
need four if they were well-placed (area = r2 - 3*5*5 = 75; 287/75 - 4). Assuming the operator got
10% penetration, 46,000 households, and at peak times 25% were online and 25% of them were
downloading at any one time, the 200 Mbps provided by the four dishes would still have to service
2,875 households so each household could expect 69 kbps, equivalent to narrowband (i.e., dial-up)
service speeds. Providing each household with 3 Mbps, which Comcast currently offers, would require
probably 50 dishes, or 100 times as many dishes (since there would be some network planning issues) at
which point the cost/subscriber looks far less attractive.
Yale Journal on Regulation
presently negotiate with each utility, which substantially slows the deployment
of the service.
Two non-technology based responses appear even less likely to disrupt the
current concentration of broadband access. First, municipal broadband
programs have been initiated by cities hoping to reap the benefits of broadband
penetration among their residents. Although cable and DSL firms owe their
positioning partly to state support, these firms have stridently objected to the
use of tax dollars funding competition to private enterprise. 56 Using their
political clout in Washington, they have managed to get a Congressional bill
put forward which would substantially limit such municipal broadband
programs.57 Second, the cable industry's victory in Brand X essentially
relegates line sharing to extinction. Line sharing meant that unaffiliated ISPs
would be permitted access to the last-mile infrastructure of DSL and cable
providers-a regime known as "open access." '59 Since ISPs manage the flow of
last-mile network traffic, a line sharing rule provides a structural remedy to
discriminatory conduct by the owners of the physical networks. Consumers are
granted a greater choice over their gatekeeper and thus vertically integrated
operators are less likely to discriminate against certain content. Although
economic and legal arguments can be made in support of affiliated ISPs and
against line sharing, one must acknowledge that the demise of "open access"
strengthens cable and DSL firms. 60 The FCC's support of the Brand X ruling
and subsequent extension to DSL service is a rejection of "open access."
61
Although Congress could conceivably undo this result, the political power of
operators makes such legislation infeasible. Without such a structural response
56 See Municipal Provision of Broadband Services and the Merits of HB 1325: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Utilities and Telecommunications, 2005 Leg. (Fla. 2005) (statement of Kent
Lassman, Research Fellow, H. Comm. on Utilities and Telecommunications) (stating that such
investments put taxpayer money at risk and may disadvantage the private sector which does not have
access to low-cost capital such as municipal bonds). See also Thomas Lenard, Government Entry into
the Telecom Business: Are the Benefits Commensurate with the Costs?, PROGRESS ON POINT (Progress
& Freedom Found., Washington, D.C.), Feb. 2004, at 1.
57 See Broadband Investment 2nd Consumer Choice Act, S. 1504, 109th Cong. § 15(a) (2005),
(bill sponsored by Sen. John Ensign (R-NV) would impose a host of conditions on planners of municipal
broadband).
58 See Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 U.S. 2688, 2695
(2005).
59 See Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the
Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925 (2001).
60 The debate over "open access" has been extensive and is beyond the reach of this Article.
For the strongest argument in favor of "open access," see LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS:
THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 147-67 (2001). This book builds off an earlier
article. See Lemley & Lessig, supra note 59. In defense of integrated ISPs and the end of line sharing,
see Joseph Farrell & Phillip J..Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access Policies, 17
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85 (2003). See also Spulber & Yoo, supra note 10 (arguing that open access
regulations implicate physical takings jurisprudence by requiring network owners to permit third parties
to place equipment on their property).
61 See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities,
supra note 20, at T 9 (defining all wireline broadband Internet access as information services rather than
a telecommunications service with common-carrier obligations).
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available, policymakers seeking to limit the power of broadband firms must
consider a conduct approach.62
In reviewing the industry structure, it is worth noting that other layers of
the Internet appear significantly more competitive. While some large scale
firms exist in applications, e.g., eBay in auctions, their power is still of a
different order than that of the platform provider. Not only has no upstream
player attempted to integrate backward into the physical layer, but they also do
not derive their power from an underlying natural monopoly.63 Thus,
broadband service providers integrating forward confront a highly fragmented
market in sharp contrast to the concentration of their primary market.
Although the foregoing illustrates the broadband industry today, its
nascent stage of development urges caution against views that it will always
look the same. New technologies still offer the potential of competing
platforms, especially if BPL receives some expediting at the state level (or
through preemption) and if wireless overcomes its economic limitations. For
the foreseeable future, however, it appears that most users will have little or no
choice among broadband operators. The introduction of switching costs only
aggravates the market power of incumbents. Thus, the primary market appears
sufficiently concentrated to inquire into the role of private firms as gatekeepers
of the Internet, especially as they integrate forward to compete with other
applications.
C. Economic Concepts: Congested Networks in a Vertically Integrated Industry
1. Network Effects
A networked business provides a platform and manages interaction among
members. 64 A "network effect" arises when one user's value of participating in
a network increases with the addition of more users to the network. The fax
machine serves as the paradigmatic case for such a phenomenon. A fax was
useless to its first purchaser until a second purchaser enabled the two to
communicate. As more users joined, the utility of the fax for the first user
increased because she could communicate with more people. This initial user
paid nothing to additional users even though their membership created
62 See Wu, supra note 16.
63 Google announced plans to support a WiFi deployment in San Francisco. See Verne
Kopytoff & Ryan Kim, Google Offers S.F. Wi-Fi-For Free, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 1, 2005, at Al.
However, Google's plans contemplate funding a third-party build out of the infrastructure and offering
the service to city residents for free. Thus, it serves really as an example of a municipal broadband
program rather than a content provider integrating backward into the physical layer.
64 See generally Thomas R. Eisenmann, Winner-Take-All in Networked Markets, HARVARD
BUSINESS SCHOOL CASE #N9-806-131 (2006); Eisenmann, Platform-Mediated Networks: Definitions
and Core Concepts, HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL CASE #N9-807-049 (2006); William D. Rahm & Eli
Cohen, Pre-Paid Legal's Promise: An Insurance Finn or a Matching Network? 13-16 (Dec. 2005)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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incremental value for her.65 Thus, additional participation yielded a positive
externality benefiting the first user.
The two most common network structures are homogenous, as seen in
most communications technologies, and heterogeneous (hereinafter, "a two-
sided network").66 Homogenous structures are simply those in which users
exchange roles frequently-the sender of the fax is often the receiver.
Economists offer a more technical definition: "[T]he market for interactions
between the two sides is one-sided if the volume ... of transactions realized on
the platform depends only on the aggregate price level."67 In a homogeneous
structure, reallocation of the price between buyers and sellers will not change
the volume because buyers and sellers operate in both roles repeatedly.
Two-sided networks, by contrast, have distinct sets of users who
consistently play their defined role in transactions. Success with such a network
requires not only choosing the right pricing level, but also the appropriate
pricing structure since differential pricing of each side can meaningfully impact
aggregate volume. For example, video game businesses have a platform
(usually a console like Xbox), end users, and game developers. The platform
provider must decide what to charge end users for the console and whether to
charge application developers for access to the codes that allow games to be
produced for that system. The developers will have a higher demand for the
platform if there are many end users and the end users will enjoy more value
from their participation as the number of games available increases. Thus,
platform owners have to solve a "chicken and egg" problem: how much to
charge each side in order to seed enough users to create value for the other side,
initiating the virtuous circle.
68
Broadband technology exhibits two network effects because it is both a
standard communications infrastructure ("homogenous") and a platform similar
to the video game company with end users and application developers
("heterogeneous" or "two-sided"). As a pure communications vehicle, all users
of the network are homogeneous-both senders and recipients of
information-who gain value from having more participants on the network
with whom to communicate. From another perspective, broadband is a two-
sided network because applications and content are complements to
technologies like cable modem service and DSL. Companies like Google,
Vonage and Amazon will develop more services when they are confident that
there are more users whom they can reach. On the other side, the presence of
65 The incremental increase in willingness-to-pay becomes de minimis after a critical number
of users join. However, in theory, an additional email user increases the value of all existing users since
it adds another potential party with whom to communicate.
66 Although most scholars term this structure a "one-sided market," Eisenmann makes a
valuable point that not all markets are networks and not all are two-sided (buyers/sellers) so
"homogenous" clarifies the issue.
67 Rochet & Tirole, supra note 22.
68 See Evans, supra note 22.
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these applications increases users' willingness-to-pay for broadband and
therefore fuels user adoption. Promoting both innovation at the application-
level and adoption by users requires managing the network to attract both sides.
Platform owners are in the best position to capture the value of network
effects. As the willingness to pay increases among both users and developers,
broadband firms can charge each side more. Currently, one side-the
developers--do not really pay for access to the platform. The absence of any
pricing on this side may result in overconsumption that can produce negative
externalities. In addition, the ability of platform owners to integrate forward
and compete with applications adds complexity to the use of this network
effects theory.
2. Economics of Congestion
Frequently referred to as an "information superhighway," the Internet is
subject to congestion much like physical highways. When networks are subject
to congestion, negative externalities arise because one customer's usage can
degrade the quality of another user's service. 69 Imagine, for example, an airport
security line. If a traveler shows up and there is a free station, she walks
through. If, instead, the traveler arrives and there are other passengers ahead of
her in line, the traveler will feel a cost of that delay. In some cases, the traveler
is time-sensitive because delay could cause her to miss her flight. Indeed, she
might be willing to pay a fee in order to jump ahead in line. If a mechanism
existed to identify relative demand among those passengers waiting in line, the
security personnel could attempt to re-order the line based on demand rather
than on its current system of first-come, first-serve in order to maximize
welfare among travelers.
Congestion exists on the Internet, too. Just like passengers entering airport
security, when too many data packets arrive at the last-mile network, they form
a queue. The resulting delay in speed reduces the quality of service. 70 A major
cause of this congestion is over-consumption by a small set of users. Typically,
broadband customers pay a flat-rate monthly fee for unlimited service. The
pricing is established in part based on the return that operators demand on the
amount of infrastructure they project will be required by the estimated usage of
those customers. Statistics confirm that while end users pay a flat-rate monthly
fee for service, consumption is not distributed evenly. BellSouth, for example,
71
claims that 1% of users drive 40% of Internet traffic. Since many facilities are
shared architectures, i.e., dozens of consumers may access the Internet through
69 See Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, 94 GEO.
L.J. 1847 (2006). For the classic analysis of how externalities lead to market failure, see ALFRED.C.
PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 172-88 (4th ed. 1948).
70 See Yoo, supra note 69, at 1861-62.
71 See Dionne Searcey, Consumers Could See New Web Rates: Use More, Pay More, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 2, 2006, at B 1.
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one pipe, "over-consumers" will significantly slow other consumers' service, as
operators do not deploy sufficient capacity to meet demand.72
Not only is congestion produced by a disproportionate few, but the costs
of this externality are not uniformly distributed. The airport security example
helps illustrate how certain users feel the effects of congestion most acutely.
Missing her flight was a much greater cost to the late traveler than waiting for
an additional person to clear security would have been to the passengers in
front of her. In the broadband context, the costs of congestion for time-sensitive
applications, such as streaming media or voice over internet protocol (VolP),
are far more severe than the impact to other services, like email. Indeed, VoIP
or video products may fail to perform with too much delay, equivalent to
missing the flight altogether, while email will simply arrive in the inbox a
moment later, where it may languish for hours just like the passengers who
have arrived early for their flight. The essential differences in the character of
applications would be irrelevant if capacity were infinite, eliminating all
congestion. But just as there will always be delays at some security checkpoints
no matter how many additional ones are added, so too is there likely to be
significant congestion on broadband networks for the foreseeable future. 73
Two primary responses exist for congestion. The first is usage-based
pricing, which is intuitively appealing because the Internet is a club good, i.e., a
good shared by more than one person. 74 Reliance on flat-rate pricing often
results in inefficiently high levels of congestion and over-consumption of
broadband.75 Original access to the Internet, through dial-up, was accomplished
through a "pay as you go" model. The economic intuition is simply that the
private cost of consuming an additional unit of capacity is zero under a fixed-
rate regime so utility-maximizing users will increase consumption until their
marginal utility is zero.7 6 In the process, they will create substantial congestion
costs for others.
72 Cable operates on a shared architecture whereby a group of users, e.g., 100, may share the
same access pipe that connects to a backhaul point in order to transfer data to/from the Internet.
73 Continued congestion is likely due to two factors. First, there is increasing use of time-
sensitive and bandwidth intensive applications. The former cares about getting through quickly and the
latter is tantamount to a large tour group trying to get through security ahead of other passengers.
Second, investment in new infrastructure tends to be lumpy since demand is uncertain and the fixed
costs of expansion are significant. See generally Christopher S. Yoo, Promoting Broadband Through
Network Diversity 19 (Feb. 6, 2006) (research paper prepared for the National Cable and
Telecommunications Association), available at http://www.ncta.com/DocumentBinary.aspx?id=286
(noting that decisions to expand capacity are complicated by the "lumpiness of network capacity created
by the indivisibility of fixed costs and the fact that increasing network capacity typically takes a
considerable amount of time").
74 See Yoo, supra note 69, at 1863. Club goods differ from public goods because
consumption by an additional person creates congestion costs that cause the quality of service provided
to others to deteriorate. See James Buchanan, An Economic Theory of Clubs, 32 ECONOMICA 1 (1965).
75 The effect of congestion thus operates in tension with the network effect-whereas one
effect explains the costs imposed on other users by the addition of a new customer, the other identifies
an increase in willingness to pay as more users join (indirectly by spurring demand for application
developers).
76 See Yoo, supra note 69, at 1864.
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Despite the appeal of usage-based pricing, fixed-rate regimes dominate
broadband.77 Many argue that this model contributed to the explosion of
Internet usage as consumers could "web surf' without incurring incremental
charges. 78 Today, consumers expect "always on" and unlimited fixed-rate
service and changing that expectation may be difficult. In addition, metering is
required for usage-based pricing and that requires significant transaction costs
likely to deter broadband firms. Indeed, every communication on the Internet
is broken into smaller packets that are transmitted individually and reassembled
at their destination. Thus, each communication requires multiple records. One
study estimates that a ten-minute phone call over the Internet would require
tens of thousands of records to account for the associated packets. 79 While new
equipment may enable broadband providers to dramatically lower this metering
cost, it does not appear that usage-based pricing will become economical in the
near term.
80
Instead of usage-based pricing, network owners might mitigate congestion
costs by restricting certain applications and prioritizing others. At the extreme,
this approach could take the form of blocking certain applications or practices
such as unauthorized re-selling of capacity, home networking, attachments, or
commercial uses. It is important to see how these uses contribute to
substantial congestion. For example, bandwidth resales impose congestion by
transforming a single connection into one serving multiple end users.82 The
corollary, returning to the airport security example, would be one ticketholder
bringing an entire group with her through the security line. The other members
of the group are not contributing whatever fractional share of a ticket goes to
77 It is important to distinguish tiered-pricing. On the one hand, it does not fully resolve the
congestion issue by internalizing costs to the user. On the other hand, its successful implementation
requires many of the same monitoring costs. Otherwise, there is no mechanism for enforcing the tiered
system.
78 See, e.g., Paul J.J. Welfens & Andre Jungmittag, Effects of an Internet Flat Rate on Growth
and Employment in Germany, (February 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available
at http://www.digital-law.net/welfens/welfensen.pdf.
79 See Tim Wilson, Billing Systems Market Reaps Huge Growth: How Telecom Carriers
Handle Phone Bills Can Make or Break Their Customer Base, TELEPATH, Jan. 5, 1998, at 15, quoted in
Yoo, supra note 69, at 1875. To understand voice transmission over Internet, imagine that each syllable
of a word was broken up into packets and transmitted separately. Thus, "hello" would become "hel" and
"lo." It is important to understand these mechanics to appreciate the transaction costs associated with
metering, as well as the time-sensitive quality of voice transmission. If, for example, there was
congestion along the stretch of the network that "hel" traveled but not on the path taken by "lo," then the
receiver might hear the packets re-combined as "lohel."
80 Searcey, supra note 71.
81 Comcast has even written letters to customers using a lot of capacity that threaten to
terminate service if they do not "dial down [their] usage." Matthew Fordahl, Comeast Limits Broadband
Usage (Jan. 30, 2004), http://www.cbsnews.constories/2004/0l/30/tech/printable597032.shtml.
82 A corollary to bandwidth resales is simply illegal "piggybacking" on someone else's
connection. Although prohibited as "theft of service," it is quite common for people to wirelessly access
a broadband network for which a neighbor pays. The only difference between this and broadband resales
is that the paying user does not know that she is sharing her connection. The result, i.e., congestion, is
still the same. For a discussion of this issue, see Michel Marriott, Hey Neighbor, Stop Piggybacking on
My Wireless, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2006, at Al.
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supporting the security line, but they are imposing a cost on other users.
Similarly, when someone buys access through their home but shares it with
multiple other users, they are paying a fee far less than the demand they are
imposing on the network. Prohibiting this activity might preserve fixed-rate
pricing while mitigating the externality of congestion by freeing up more
capacity.
Alternatively, network owners might become even more sophisticated
managers of applications in order to limit the effects of congestion. As
previously mentioned, applications pay no fees beyond the typical access
charges. Instead of monitoring end users' consumption, network owners could
simply require those applications that require time-sensitive delivery to pay for
access.83 The platform would not be forced to meter usage but could use
demand from applications as a proxy-an application provider would
presumably only pay for time-sensitive delivery if users cared about avoiding
delay. Under this system, the time-sensitive application could pay for priority
which allows it to perform properly and gives the operator more funds to invest
in further capacity. An equivalent scenario would be charging the late traveler
in exchange for permitting him to skip to the front of the line. Over time, the
airport security office could afford to provide an extra station for business- and
first-class travelers who valued avoiding delays, and in the process they would
relieve some of the congestion for other passengers too.
Lawmakers considering a regime for managing broadband access must
acknowledge the negative externality associated with congestion. Sophisticated
technology might enable usage-based pricing to become a cost-effective
solution to this problem. In the absence of such a metering response, network
operators have an interest in treating applications differently in order to
maximize welfare among applications and, ultimately, end users.
3. Vertical Relations
Any framework for governing access to broadband applications must not
only anticipate the value of network effects and the costs of congestion, but
also the implications associated with network owners creating "vertical
relations.' 84 These relations include not just integration into applications
through merger or organic growth, but also contractual agreements with firms
in related markets. The 2001 Southwestern Bell Company (SBC) and Yahoo!
pact offers an example of a vertical relation. SBC provides DSL service in over
a dozen states. After the SBC-Yahoo! agreement SBC's users received a
subscription to Yahoo!, which made Yahoo! the default homepage for all SBC
DSL users. Although SBC did not limit its users from accessing content by
Yahoo! 's competitors, such an exclusive relationship was not prevented by law.
83 These applications would presumably pass on the charge to end users.
84 See Farrell & Weiser, supra note 60, at 87.
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Moreover, Yahoo! might have contracted to receive prioritized delivery on
SBC's network such that its data would leap ahead of other competitors' data if
congestion required queuing.
Telecommunications regulation and antitrust policy traditionally have
diverged in their treatment of vertical relations. 85 In the 1970s, the Chicago
School influenced mainstream antitrust thinking to accept that vertical relations
could provide efficiency benefits to consumers. In the context of a
complements-based business, a strict separation of the application providers
and platform owners can lead to costly hold-up hazards or free riding by
application firms. 86 Moreover, vertical integration can eliminate double
marginalization where two monopolists (one in the application layer and the
other in the physical layer) both impose a monopoly markup. 87 Finally, as
Professors Clayton Christensen and Michael Raynor have extensively argued, if
the interfaces between applications and a platform are not well defined,
innovation can be slower and more costly, and integration may be preferable.
88
As a result, courts dealing with antitrust claims often presume such vertical
relations are unobjectionable unless a fact-intensive inquiry shows otherwise.
89
By contrast, starting in the 1970s, the vertically integrated AT&T network
was broken up as a result of a policy to develop and protect open interfaces.
90
The philosophy underlying the breakup held that "powerful firms at one level
should not be allowed to leverage that power into-or perhaps even participate
in-adjacent competitive segments." 9 1 The 1996 Telecom Act initiated a new
regime that promoted competition among local exchange carriers (e.g., the
"Baby Bells") and long-distance providers (e.g., AT&T, MCI, and Sprint) for
customers, allowing each to integrate and compete in the others' traditional
spheres of influence. Recently, mergers of SBC/AT&T, and potentially
BellSouth, as well as VerizonlMCI may mark the full-scale reintegration of
different network verticals.
Analysis of vertical relations requires evaluating the competitive position
of firms at each level.92 If there is robust competition at the physical layer,
concerns about integration are muted because consumers can always switch
among broadband providers. 93 As previously discussed, the last-mile broadband
market is currently characterized by two dominant natural monopolies present
85 Id.
86 See Yoo, supra note 39, at 262-64 (noting that vertical integration guards against free
riding, hold-up problems, and other strategic behaviors by complementors).
87 See Farrell & Weiser, supra note 60, at 6.
88 CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN & MICHAEL E. RAYNOR, THE INNOVATOR'S SOLUTION:
CREATING AND SUSTAINING SUCCESSFUL GROWTH 125-35 (2003).
89 See, e.g., Continental T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49-56 (1977).
90 See Farrell & Weiser, supra note 60, at 87.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 As previously mentioned, the presence of switching costs may complicate this issue further
by creating barriers to exit for consumers even where multiple providers are available.
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in most, if not all, markets. Cable and DSL may compete against each other,
but their statuses are defined by their origins from technologies that had almost
exclusive access into residential homes. Such access is prohibitively costly to
replicate, thus relatively immune from competition.
Different theories address the likelihood that a monopolist broadband
provider will inefficiently discriminate against unaffiliated applications. The
"one monopoly rent theory" claims that a monopolist has no incentive to
monopolize a complementary product if it is used in fixed proportions with the
monopoly good and is competitively supplied.94 Joseph Farrell and Philip
Weiser introduce the concept of internalizing complementary efficiencies to
argue that a network owner will only deny access to unaffiliated competitors if
it is efficient to do so.95 It is unsurprising that where a platform provider
chooses to focus on maximizing the wealth of its platform, and avoids forward
integration, it will seek to maximize competition and innovation among
applications so it can leverage the network effect that motivates user demand.
96
Where a platform monopolist does integrate into the applications market,
Farrell and Weiser's theory claims it will still "welcome value-added
innovations by independent firms.., in order to profit from a more valuable
platform." 97 The argument assumes that providers can extract more value from
increased demand for the platform than from their gains through sales of
applications. Importantly, the theory allows for some limitations on
competition in the applications market which benefit the platform's users.
Restricting some applications to manage congestion is one conceivable
example where operators might attempt to limit access for applications in order
to maximize welfare for users.
These limitations, however, may result in an inefficient outcome for users
when the platform monopolist can gain more from exercising market power in
applications than it can from increasing demand for the platform. The classic
example occurs where pricing for the platform is regulated, perhaps below the
profit-maximizing level, and thus the network owner seeks to monopolize the
applications market in order to take additional profits in that market, perhaps
inefficiently. 98 This reasoning supports unregulated pricing of broadband
access to prevent operators from acting unfairly in the applications market to
compensate for platform pricing set below the profit-maximizing level. Another
more relevant exception occurs when operators maintain separate legacy
businesses threatened by broadband applications. Specifically, VoIP and IPTV
94 For an illustration, see RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 198-99 (2d ed. 2001). An
issue with broadband is that the applications are not used in fixed proportions to the access provided and
thus may create an incentive to monopolize the complementary product to provide flexibility in pricing
both components.
95 Farrell & Weiser, supra note 60, at 89.
96 Id. at 101.
97 Id. at 102-03.
98 Id. at 105-06.
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serve as substitutes, and thus competitive threats, to traditional voice and cable
TV frequently offered by the same firms who sell broadband. The Madison
River case, described at the beginning of this Article, offers the paradigmatic
example of a phone company restricting access for a broadband application in
order to maintain its more expensive traditional service at the expense of its
broadband users. Even if Madison River had offered a competitive VolP
service, it would likely have slowed Vonage in order to maintain its subscriber
base of voice customers through a broadband application if its legacy product
were no longer viable.
Lawmakers, therefore, must acknowledge the tension that exists in these
vertically integrated broadband providers. First, due to network effects, a
platform provider has strong incentives to maintain competition in its adjacent
markets because robust innovation in applications increases the platform's
value. Broadband firms can appropriate some of this increased value in the
absence of price regulation. Furthermore, restrictions are not per se inefficient
because certain services may impose such severe harm on other users (e.g.,
viruses) that operators should be encouraged to limit their access.
On the other hand, broadband providers may seek to engage in
exclusionary conduct that harms consumers. 99 There are many subtle ways to
disadvantage an unaffiliated developer (e.g., an interface design that slows the
application or an onerous pricing policy) that can benefit the network owner. 100
An operator may seek to increase its power in the applications market over
competitive services by restricting or degrading the independent developer's
access to its users. In such situations, a network owner can weaken a rival by
shrinking the pool of users that the rival can reach. 10 1 The prospect of
inefficient discrimination by broadband firms requires lawmakers to construct a
model that evaluates both the market power of the firm in its primary market
and the nature of its differential treatment of applications.
D. Legal Background
Developing effective policy in the arena of broadband access requires
close attention to several legal principles since the Constitution may limit
certain regulatory approaches and since existing legal doctrines may already
have some influence over the issue. Sharp conflicts emerge in discussion of the
Constitution's position on access. Network owners argue that regulation
amounts to an unlawful taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
Conversely, concerns about broadband firms restricting access to undesirable
applications or even specific viewpoints has motivated First Amendment
99 See generally van Schewick, supra note 19.
100 See Joseph Farrell & Michael L. Katz, Innovation, Rent Extraction and Integration in
Systems Markets, 48 J. INDUS. ECON. 413, 421-26 (2000).
101 Since many applications are subject to scale economies, barring one application's access
to users can weaken a complementary product.
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arguments in support of government intervention-although the speaking rights
of the network owners themselves may pose free speech claims cutting against
regulation. The complexity of regulating in this area is amplified by the
presence of both federal and state commissions which may require some
sensitivity to the role of the federal administrative state. And finally, any model
will operate in the shadow of antitrust jurisprudence that already seeks to limit
unfair use of market power by dominant industries. While exploring these
broad fields of law in detail is beyond the scope of this Article, it is possible to
highlight the major issues and the analytical frameworks that lawmakers should
consider.
1. Fifth Amendment
Many advocates of a deregulatory approach to broadband access have
sought to ground the discussion as a property rights debate. 10 2 Indeed, they
have even claimed that supporters of network neutrality are engaged in a
"crusade against property rights in broadband networks."' 0 3 Although it is
undeniable that operators have a real property interest in their infrastructure,
most proposals for prohibiting discrimination against unaffiliated content do
not raise any significant Fifth Amendment concerns.
The Takings Clause analysis depends significantly on whether the
regulatory approach includes a physical invasion.1° Daniel Spulber and
Christopher Yoo make this point effectively when they note that "[R]egulation
[that] simply adjusts the terms under which parties can contract ... is subject
traditionally to a rather permissive standard of review under the Takings Clause
.... Compell[ed] access to a physical network, in.contrast, ... [is] subject to
the more restrictive standards associated with the Court's physical takings
jurisprudence."' 0 5  The structural approach of open access-requiring
broadband firms to allow the equipment of unaffiliated ISPs on their lines-
may entail such a physical invasion, but regulations against discriminatory
behavior affect only the "terms" under which operators contract with
application developers and end users. 1°6
Regulations affecting terms of use rarely constitute a taking. In Lingle v.
Chevron, the Supreme Court recently clarified how to evaluate a takings
challenge. 107 Writing for a unanimous court, Justice O'Connor limited per se
102 See Owen & Rosston, supra note 3.
103 Thierer, supra note 13, at 17.
104 Some overlook the importance of "physical invasion" in takings analysis and assume that
any policy which restricts an owner's use of property is subject to a takings challenge. See, e.g., id. at 16
("[E]very discussion of forced access regulatory policy-whether it is structural or behavioral in
character-should begin with a discussion of property rights.").
105 Spulber & Yoo, supra note 10, at 933.
106 Although some believe that "open access" proposals that anticipate line sharing by ISPs
would constitute takings, the point has not been clearly resolved by the Court. See id. at 1021-23.
107 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
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takings to two categories: (1) where the government requires an owner to suffer
a permanent physical invasion of her property' °8 or (2) where a regulation
completely deprives an owner of "all economically beneficial use" of her
property. 0 9  Since non-discrimination in broadband access does not
contemplate any restriction on charging end users, such a regulation does not
deprive network owners of "all economically beneficial use" of their
property.
10
Outside of these two per se categories, the "ad hoc" test laid out in Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York governs regulatory takings
challenges.11' The test includes (1) the character of government action, (2) the
severity of the economic impact, and (3) the degree of interference with
reasonable, investment-backed expectations.' 1 2 An inquiry into the purposes of
broadband access regulation shows that a challenge here is likely to fail. First,
such a policy intends to increase demand for broadband among both consumers
(who will have more content) and application developers (providing them the
certainty of reaching users). By increasing demand for the platform, the
regulation increases its value and, subsequently, the economic return for the
platform owner. Even if operators might improve their return more through
discrimination, regulation restricting such activity hardly has a "severe"
economic impact and essentially amounts to an adjustment of the "benefits and
burdens of economic life for the common good.""' 3 The Fifth Amendment,
therefore, provides little assistance to critics of non-discrimination policies for
access to broadband applications.
2. First Amendment
By contrast, proponents of regulation cite constitutional concerns with
self-regulation. If broadband networks become the primary means of
communication, they ask, does the power of operators to exclude objectionable
content threaten freedom of speech? At an abstract level, the First Amendment
"focuses on the importance of securing an open environment in which all can
108 Id. at 538 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982)).
109 Id. (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992)).
110 Some critics of access regulations argue that elimination of an unrestrained right to
exclude should amount to a taking, even under the law's restrictive tests. See, e.g., Owen & Rosston,
supra note 3, at 27 ("subtracting without compensation one of the property rights that an investor
created (or would create) through a risky investment of funds with an opportunity cost clearly will
reduce, perhaps to zero, the amount it is rational to invest" (emphasis added)).
111 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
112 Id. at 124.
113 Id. In addition, it is worth noting the similarity of these regulations with "must carry"
provisions applied against cable television companies. In the seminal case on this matter, Turner Broad.
Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) [hereinafter Turner II], where cable operators were forced to
carry certain local broadcast channels, equivalent to mandating access to broadband applications, neither
the plaintiffs nor the Court found it necessary to mention the Fifth Amendment implications of such
rules.
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equally experiment with how to think and speak, and where no one can
determine for anyone else what is orthodox."'"14 Some have even argued that
"the First Amendment embodies an affirmative right of access to the means of
speech, judicially enforceable against a government agency that does not adopt
policies that secure access to the means of effective communication." ' 15 The
courts have not gone this far, but the First Amendment still supplies a basis for
regulating fair access to broadband content.
Two separate strains of constitutional jurisprudence may support
regulation in this area. First, in Pruneyard, the Supreme Court held that the free
speech rights of a shopping center owner were not violated by an order to allow
patrons of his center to peaceably express their views, even when he disliked
them, so long as he continued to open his center to the public and maintained
the ability to disclaim those views not his own. 116 Since the broadband network
is also private property opened to the public for commercial and expressive
purposes, perhaps operator restrictions on objectionable content constitute a
violation of the application developer's rights of free expression. Indeed, a
novel argument might be made that the state's granting of licenses for
broadband firms to market their services constitutes state action and, as a result,
any burdens placed by operators on users' rights to free expression may be
imputed to the state.' '
7
Second, the Court has confirmed the power of Congress to force cable
network operators to carry certain television content it deemed important-
primarily broadcast channels. Although the Turner cases represent an
acknowledgment of the free speech rights of operators, the holding established
that Congress may limit those rights so long as it can demonstrate important
governmental interests and not substantially burden more speech than
necessary to further those interests.' 8
114 Yochai Benkler, Property, Commons, and the First Amendment: Towards a Core
Common Infrastructure 7 (2001) (white paper for the First Amendment Program Brennan Center for
Justice at NYU School of Law).
115 Id. at 27, quoting Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right,
80 HARV. L. REv. 1641 (1967).
116 Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). Justice Rehnquist writing for
the majority said:
Most important, the shopping center by choice of its owner is not limited to the personal use of
appellants. It is instead a business establishment that is open to the public to come and go as
they please. The views expressed by members of the public in passing out pamphlets or
seeking signatures for a petition thus will not likely be identified with those of the owner.
447 U.S. at 87. It should be noted that this case was limited to the question of whether the California
court's decision to recognize the appellee's right of free expression in the shopping center infringed on
the appellant's First Amendment rights. The case might have been different if the question were whether
a government order to accommodate all expression on its property infringed on the property owner's
right of free expression. In addition, it is not clear whether a network owner has a viable method of
disclaiming support for the views with which it doesn't agree and therefore whether its position is
tantamount to that of the shopping center owner.
117 Author has found no evidence that this argument has been advanced in legal proceedings.
118 See Turner 1, 520 U.S. 180.
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Although the First Amendment is probably better employed in support of
regulation, there are some reasons to believe operators, might win a contest
over speech rights. Most notably, Professor Philip Weiser points out that the
FCC's classification of broadband as an "information service," upheld by
Brand X, infuses operators with speaking rights that they would not have as
common carriers.' 9 Furthermore, a federal district court struck down a line-
sharing requirement for ISPs intended to limit operators control over content on
the basis that the requirement violated the speaking rights of the operator, who
was distinguishable from a common carrier telephone service provider.
1 20
Although Pruneyard and Turner II still cast doubt on the use of the First
Amendment against broadband access regulations, some advocates would like




Communications have long been overseen by a patchwork of government
regulators. Since the establishment of the FCC under the Communications Act
of 1934, the federal government has been authorized to regulate interstate and
international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite and cable.
122
State and municipal bodies, however, retained an active role through granting
cable franchises and setting rates.
Leaving the issue of overseeing broadband access to states is illogical and
out of step with recent congressional action. The Telecommunications Act of
1996, for example, sought to promote competition and reduce regulation to
"encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies.' ' 23
A uniform approach is necessary to achieve this goal, especially given that the
footprints of broadband firms frequently exceed state borders. Courts have
already demonstrated a willingness to support federal preemption on this issue,
but lawmakers should consider more comprehensive legislation in this area.
12 4
Brand X concluded that the FCC is permitted to classify broadband
transmission as an "information service," but also ruled on the full extent of the
FCC's authority to regulate such service. Philip Weiser proposes that the FCC
119 Phillip J. Weiser, Toward a Next Generation Regulatory Strategy, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
41, 65 (2003).
120 Comcast Cablevision of Broward County, Inc. v. Broward County, 124 F. Supp. 2d 685,
693 (S.D. Fla. 2000) ("The cable operator, unlike a telephone service, does not sell transmission but
instead offers a collection of content.").
121 In a conversation with the author, former FCC Chairman Reed Hundt expressed the view
that the government should limit speaking rights in the broadband context to users, including
presumably application developers. Interview with Reed Hundt, Chairman, Federal Communications
Commission (Apr. 13, 2006).
122 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (2000).
123 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
124 Spulber & Yoo, supra note 10, at 1016.
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could be entitled to oversee the Internet "by reference to its need to regulate
'information platforms' that can support the delivery of voice, video and text
applications."' 125 As he points out, in today's world, broadband access itself is
the platform upon which providers will rely to offer their Internet-delivered
content and services. Thus, the content that was previously delivered directly
by a physical coaxial cable or copper wire is now transmitted through
broadband networks. As this platform replaces the legacy infrastructures, the
FCC can only achieve its express statutory purpose if it is empowered to
oversee the management of those networks.' 26 Either the FCC can employ this
regulatory model and seek congressional endorsement later or Congress can
affirmatively extend the agency such power in a new bill-since the 1996
Telecom Act only barely anticipated the rise of broadband. 1
27
4. Antitrust
Finally, antitrust doctrine, with its purpose of constraining unfair use of
market power, serves as a backstop to any regulation in this area. Two cases
inform the antitrust analysis of access for broadband applications. The Supreme
Court's landmark decision in Continental T. V v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. replaced
per se prohibitions of vertical restrictions with an evaluation under the "rule of
reason," which entails a fact-intensive inquiry into the competitive effects of
the restriction. 128 Although the dispute in Continental T.V dealt with the
relationship between a manufacturer and its franchise retailers, Justice Powell's
majority opinion embraced the idea that "[v]ertical restrictions promote
interbrand competition by allowing the manufacturer to achieve certain
efficiencies in the distribution of his products."1 29 Antitrust doctrine continues
to presumptively permit vertical relations and thus courts may not take issue
with the extension of network owners into the application and content layers of
broadband.
On the other hand, where the primary market is highly concentrated,
Continental T.V. may be less applicable because there is no interbrand
125 Weiser, supra note 119, at 61.
126 Id. at 63.
127 Id. at 62-63.
128 433 U.S. 36 (1977). Justice Brandeis provided one of the most popular statements of the
rule of reason in Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918):
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy
competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to
the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was
imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the
restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose
or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a good intention will
save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent
may help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.
246 U.S. at 238.
129 Continental T V., 433 U.S. at 54.
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competition to encourage. In such situations, the FCC's Carterfone decision
may offer a better analogy.' 30 That decision responded to AT&T's prohibition
on competitive attachments to its lines-for example, independent makers of
phones-and spawned a regulatory regime based on "open access" to the
telecommunications network.' 3 1 The FCC also adopted pro-competitive
policies for services in markets adjacent to the incumbent telecommunications
network, known as "information services." The intention of these FCC policies
was to prevent a monopolist in the primary infrastructure market from
leveraging its market power to disadvantage unaffiliated competitors in the
secondary services market. While Brand X upheld the FCC designation of
broadband as an "information service," it did not displace the regulatory
construct from which such a designation was born. In other words, it did not
upset the idea that vertical restrictions imposed by a monopolistic platform
provider must be regulated. 32 Although the open access paradigm first
established by Carterfone would not require a network neutrality regime for
governing access to broadband applications, it does encourage some regulation
to address the potential market failures associated with vertical restrictions.
Philip Weiser supports an "antitrust-like approach to regulation" of services
such as broadband. 133 Even if lawmakers do not utilize antitrust doctrine in the
area of broadband access as explicitly as Weiser suggests, any solution must
consider the existing frameworks for addressing vertical restrictions by firms
possessing significant primary market power.
34
130 Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service, 13 F.C.C.2d 420, 424-
25 (1968). This decision arose from an antitrust action brought by the developers of the Carterfone
against AT&T, as the district court referred the issues related to AT&T's tariff to the FCC for decision.
See Carter v. AT&T, 250 F. Supp. 188, 190 (N.D. Tex. 1966), affd, 365 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1966).
131 See Weiser, supra note 119, at 66.
132 Weiser notes that the core concern behind the Computer Inquiries, which offered the
"information service" term, was that "incumbent telephone providers would use their power in the
telecommunications market to eliminate competition in the adjacent information services market." Id. at
68.
133 Id. at 75. Weiser's approach has three elements: 1) "a basic standard developed by after-
the-fact judgments" (similar to the rule of reason); 2) sensitivity to the economic efficiencies associated
with vertical integration (in light of Continental T. V.); and 3) an "awareness that regulatory
intervention" must be designed to do "more good than harm" (acknowledging regulatory costs). Weiser
specifically notes that his article "does not discuss the exact details of how such an enforcement regime
would work," thus leaving an opening for the approach that I propose below. Id. at 76 n. 151.
134 Id. at 75-76.
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II. Existing Proposals for Governing Access: Self-Regulation or Network
Neutrality
A. Self-Regulation: "Keep Your Hands Off the Market!"
1. Summary of the Self-Regulation Approach
Although a market-oriented solution may mitigate congestion by allowing
an operator to prioritize applications efficiently, the presence of concentrated
players and the potential for market failure warrants government involvement.
The absence of any restrictions may prove too tempting for these gatekeepers,
and even limited discrimination may reduce social welfare by chilling
innovation. 135 While broadband operators have a real property interest in their
infrastructure, this interest should not deter lawmakers. There is no strong legal
argument against a legal principle governing operators' treatment of broadband
applications.
2. Incentives for Efficient Self-Regulation
Broadband operators assure policymakers that the absence of significant
harm demonstrates the market's ability to regulate their conduct.' 36 And many
commentators agree, highlighting the economic forces that motivate network
owners to promote competition among applications. 137 They warn that
regulation will not only impose significant costs, but will also deter future
investment; therefore Congress should codify the customary "hands off'
approach that has so far been customary in order to minimize costs and
maximize economic development.1 38 While this unrestrained market approach
has its virtues, it overlooks the opportunities and incentives for vertically
integrated providers to leverage their gatekeeping position unfairly at the
expense of social welfare.
135 Ultimately the self-regulation pitch, as described by Owen and Rosston, seems
unconvincing. See Owen & Rosston, supra note 3, at 32 ("[T]here is no basis to assume that cable or any
other technology platform will monopolize the [broadband] service, or that if one does, it will be
profitable for that monopolist to exclude equally or more efficient upstream or downstream suppliers.").
136 See, e.g., Comcast Corporation Q4 2005 Earnings Conference Call Transcript, (Feb. 2,
2006) (statement of Brian Roberts, CEO of Comcast Corporation) ("[W]e continue to believe that
proponents of the so-called net neutrality are pursuing a solution in search of a problem."), available at
http://intemetstockblog.com/article/6476 (last visited on Apr. 26, 2006).
137 See, e.g., CLYDE PRESTOWITZ, ECON. STRATEGY INST., AMERICA'S TECHNOLOGY
FUTURE AT RISK: BROADBAND AND INVESTMENT STRATEGIES TO REFIRE INNOVATION (2006)
(discussing how the Telecommunications Act of 1996 led to economic changes and stimulated
competition).
138 See Theirer, supra note 13, at 23-24.
Vol. 24:1, 2007
Substantive Equality
A key premise behind self-regulation is that competition in the primary
market for broadband is vibrant. 139 Government interference is unnecessary,
proponents of self-regulation contend, because consumers can switch platform
providers if applications are banned or degraded. Moreover, restrictions on
vertical relations would not only prevent operators from earning an adequate
return on the capital invested in infrastructure, but would also cut against legal
doctrine, which presumes integration into an adjacent market to be reasonable
as long as the primary market is competitive. As this Article has discussed, this
picture of broadband competition defies the reality in most communities where
no more than two operators are likely to serve end users. While the degree of
concentration depends on the geographic market and perhaps more on one's
market definition, one can hardly refer to the market for broadband as a
"competitive free-for-all.' 140
In response to claims of concentration, advocates of a "hands off'
approach point to Farrell and Weiser's economic theory-namely the theory
that even a platform monopolist will make efficient choices about whether to
impose restrictions on applications.' 4 1 In a Cato Institute release, Adam Thierer
writes:
[E]ven if current [operators] have significant market power, they still have a
strong incentive to carry more content and websites to maximize consumer
utility and get consumers to spend more money for access to the service. If a
carrier attempted to greatly curtail or limit certain tyTes of Web services, it
might discourage subscribership and thus reduce profits.
4 2
There are even instances, as pointed out above, where an operator may
justifiably disfavor certain applications to benefit users. The least controversial
form of this conduct is where a network manager blocks viruses which harm
users but are most cheaply addressed by the operator. 143 More contentious is
when certain applications, such as email, are slowed to allow other time-
sensitive ones, such as voice, to get ahead in line.
139 See generally id. at I (claiming the broadband marketplace is a "competitive free-for-
all"); Owen & Rosston, supra note 3, at 17 ("[Local broadband service] today is not an entrenched
monopoly. In many areas cable companies and telephone companies compete directly for customers,
and.., wireless and satellite may soon become important additional avenues of competitive supply.").
Furthermore, Owen and Rosston state that "[t]here is no real basis to assume that [local broadband
service] will ultimately turn out to be monopolized." Owen & Rosston, supra note 3, at 19.
140 Thierer, supra note 13, at 1.
141 See Farrell & Weiser, supra note 60, at 89 ("[T]he central analytical tool .. . in our
discussion is a Chicago School-style argument we call internalizing complementary efficiencies . . .,
which] claims that even a monopolist has incentives to provide access to its platform when it is efficient
to do so.").
142 Thierer, supra note 13, at 15.
143 The alternative would require every user to purchase more advanced virus protection.
Indeed, Professor Tim Wu acknowledges that "operators usually ban ... network viruses [and while] it
is true that this is a departure from network neutrality, because it disfavors a class of applications - those
that are disruptive to the network ... it is clear that the operator has acted to solve a problem of a
negative externality... [which] few.., would argue.., is a bad thing." Wu, supra note 16, at 15 I.
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Advocates of self-regulation argue not only that applications should be
prioritized based on their demand for delivery, but also that the market is the
best judge of which applications should receive preference. 144 Although the
market is most likely the best vehicle for identifying and achieving an efficient
ordering of applications, it does not follow that operators should possess
unrestrained discretion to make these choices. Granting operators the right to
set the terms and pricing of access, including how to allocate priority positions,
empowers them to engage in a host of self-serving and ultimately inefficient
behavior. Some mechanism restraining operators' decisions must exist to
prevent both the direct harm of inefficient restrictions placed on valuable
applications and the secondary harm of discouraging innovation through the
unpredictable choices of network operators.14
5
Returning to the story of Madison River Communications may illustrate
the potential for market failure. In mid-2006, Gulfrel, a division of Madison
River, offered unlimited local and long distance phone service for over
$115/month. Vonage charged $25/month and many of Gulffel's DSL
customers, who paid $42 each month at the time, could have easily switched to
that offering. Assuming that the quality of service was equivalent, customers
should have been expected to switch because they would have saved over
$90/month. Although GulfTel's DSL service was more valuable to its users
because of the Vonage offering, one can imagine that GulfTel might have
raised its DSL price only incrementally, perhaps to $45/month.i46 By blocking
access to Vonage, or even more subtly degrading its service quality, Gulfrel
may have acted rationally, but the result would have been costly for consumers.
It is important to note that similarly perverse incentives may have existed if
GulfTel integrated forward to offer its own broadband voice service. Although
its service might not have been superior to Vonage's product, it could have
offered it for $50/month and misled consumers to believe its product as better
by slowing the delivery of Vonage data or granting priority only to its own
service in moments of congestion. In either case, customers may have believed
that they had received a deal-saving $65/month on voice and getting a better
product than Vonage. In reality, consumers would have overpaid while GulfIel
144 See Owen & Rosston, supra note 3, at 19-20 (arguing that a neutral system will not only
directly harm users of voice and video applications but will also result in an under-supply of innovation
in time-sensitive products).
145 No one will invest if there is substantial uncertainty about the terms or price of accessing
customers. See van Schewick, supra note 19; see also Letter from Tim Wu & Lawrence Lessig to
Marlene H. Dortch, supra note 17.
146 Although the point of economic indifference for Vonage subscribers is $90 (simply
capturing savings on voice in broadband pricing), Gulflel is not able to charge that amount for two
reasons. First, the perceived value of broadband has not increased to $90/month. Second, not all of
GulfTel's DSL customers use Vonage, but without any mechanism for distinguishing those who do and
those who do not (except perhaps by looking at which customers have unsubscribed from its phone
service), Gulfrel would have to charge all of its customers a higher rate. In other words, if 40% of
broadband customers switch to Vonage, the 60% of customers still using Gulfrel's phone service would
be outraged by a $90 increase in their monthly broadband bill.
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benefited both from a more valuable broadband platform, which included the
voice application, and from mitigating the lost revenue from its legacy service.
In addition, application developers like Vonage would have been less likely to
design products in the future because of the risk that broadband operators
would unfairly compete with their own services. 1
47
3. Real Costs v. Absent Harms
Beyond the incentives for efficient self-regulation, a frequent point made
by opponents of access regulation is that regulatory costs are real while the
harm is illusory. An initial misconception is that regulation comes only in the
form of market-shaping rules.148 Certainly, any mandated access would impose
administrative costs. As Justice Breyer has noted, "[e]ven the simplest kind of
compelled sharing ... means that someone must oversee the terms and
conditions of that sharing."' 49 And the experience of the 1996 Telecom Act
illustrates the enormous quagmire that can be created by imposing access
requirements and establishing prices.' 50 Furthermore, the rulemaking process
provides ample opportunity for gaming, especially when massive industries like
cable and telecommunications are involved. Companies in these sectors pour
tens of millions of dollars each year into government relations and are not
above spinning facts to their advantage.' 52 As one scholar notes, "many
affected parties will view regulatory intervention as an opportunity to gain an
advantage over a competitor and thus will provide misleading information to
regulators."' 153 While these concerns are valid, they do not make a
comprehensive case against regulation. Rather, they highlight some of the
deficiencies of addressing market failures in broadband through rulemaking.
None of these criticisms, however, weigh strongly against adjudication of
complaints after the fact, an alternative approach explored below.
147 Broadband video applications will cause similar disruption. Imagine a world of universal
broadband. Content companies, like CBS or ABC, would distribute their content, e.g., coverage of
sports events or sitcoms, via broadband because they can reach the same subscribers (perhaps more
through better customer segmentation) without paying cable fees. All other things being equal, the cable
TV model would deteriorate. However, since cable television and cable modem service are owned by
the same firms, these operators will have an incentive to either slow the broadband video application to
prevent migration from cable TV or charge the content providers for priority access.
148 See van Schweick, supra note 19, at 38 (stating that "[t]he costs of network neutrality
regulation depend on the chosen form of implementation").
149 AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Util. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 428 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
150 See Weiser, supra note 119, at 69-70 (noting that the unbundling requirements from the
1996 Telecom Act continue to produce litigation).
151 See id. at 76; see also Thierer, supra note 13, at 19-2 1.
152 Indeed, direct contributions to congressional candidates from the Bells and five largest
cable companies totaled nearly $3 million in the first ten months of 2005. Center for Responsive
Politics, from Federal Election Commission filings. Funding to industry groups and lobbying firms
undoubtedly exceeded this figure by a considerable degree.
153 See Weiser, supra note 119, at 76. See also Philip J. Weiser, Internet Governance,
Standard Setting and Self-Regulation, 28 N. KY. L. REv. 822, 841 (2001).
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Costs of regulation should properly be compared against all the harms
avoided. Advocates of a market-based solution contend that there are no
demonstrated harms.154 This view overlooks not only cases like Madison River,
but also the far greater number of allegations of more subtle degradation of
broadband applications that cause users to perceive these independent services
as inferior to the operator's service.155 Furthermore, as operators continue to
integrate forward into applications through mergers, organic growth or
contractual agreements, there will be an increasing temptation to use their
power as gatekeepers to limit the commercial success of their competitors.
In addition, the measure of harm must encompass the secondary effects of
lost innovation. A company witnessing the Madison River case may have
decided against investing in a new broadband voice service because of the risk
that operators would deny it access to users. The loss of that innovation is a
harm that must be avoided. Professors Tim Wu and Lawrence Lessig
highlighted this point in their submission to the FCC:
The question an innovator, or venture capitalist, asks when deciding whether to
develop some new Internet application is not just whether discrimination is
occurring today, but whether restrictions might be imposed when the innovation
is deployed. If the innovation is likely to excite an incentive to discrimination,
and such discrimination could occur, then the mere potential imposes a burden
on innovation today whether or not there is discrimination now. The possibility
of discrimination in the future dampens the incentives to invest today.
The self-regulatory camp argues that any loss in innovation from granting
operators unrestricted power is offset by the network owner's investment and
innovation. Addressing Wu and Lessig, in particular, Thierer comments that
they
obviously feel quite passionate about the question of innovation at the edge of
the network. But where is the concern for innovation at the core of the network,
or the innovation and investment needed to bring about entirely new network
infrastructures? Wu and Lessig are apparently content with the networks of the
present and feel comfortable imposing regulations on existing [operators] to
ensure that innovation is maximized at the edge of the existing systems.
Two problems exist with this analysis. First, it is unlikely that a handful of
broadband firms could produce as much application innovation, in aggregate,
as all the firms at the edge of the network. Thus, in seeking to maximize
consumer welfare by promoting application innovation, one would first seek to
154 In an Ex Parte Letter to the FCC, the cable industry wrote that "it is self-evident that
regulation should not be imposed merely to prevent a hypothetical threat." Letter from National Cable &
Telecommunications Ass'n to the FCC (Sept. 8, 2003) (on file with author). See also Owen and Rosston,
supra note 3, at 34 (claiming that "there is no evidence that the [proposed harm] (hardware platform
owners' controlling access and choosing content) is likely to happen, or that if it did happen it would be
harmful to consumers").
155 For a discussion of problems, see High Tech Broadband Coalition Ex Parte Letter to FCC
(June 17, 2002) (on file with author). See also Coalition of Broadband Users and Innovators Ex Parte
Letter to FCC (Nov. 18, 2002) (on file with author).
156 See Wu & Lessig, supra note 17.
157 See Thierer, supra note 13, at 18.
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provide predictability to investors at the network's edge. Second, in
determining the trade-off between granting operators full control over their
networks and encouraging application-level innovation, a central question must
be resolved: Will limits on network management reduce the incentive to invest
in broadband below the necessary level? There are several reasons to believe
that operators already possess sufficient incentives to invest in broadband. The
market for broadband is clearly greater than the market for any single
application and the platform owner can capture the positive externalities
associated with each new application, i.e., the increase in consumer demand for
broadband. As Lessig and Wu point out, the FCC has "done much... to
encourage the build-out of a broadband infrastructure."'' 58 Furthermore, no
regulations contemplate preventing broadband firms from forward integrating
into applications so they will still be able to compete for application-level
revenues, albeit on a level playing field. And finally, as the regulatory approach
explored in Part IV suggests, network owners might even charge application
developers for priority access-allowing the market to help identify demand
and order the queue efficiently.
4. Legal Basis for a Pure Market Solution
The final argument made by the deregulatory camp is a rights-based legal
argument. They contend that the networks are private property and broadband
providers have contractual relationships with their customers.' 59 Any
interference with this property or these contracts amounts to unconstitutional
state action. Further, since the FCC designation of broadband as an information
service grants it "speaking rights," operators argue that regulations on network
management amount to a violation of free expression-essentially, the
requirement to deliver all media amounts to forced speech. As previously
discussed, these arguments do not carry significant weight. In the absence of
physical invasion and with substantial opportunities to benefit from selling
broadband access, a takings challenge is unlikely to succeed. The terms of the
executory contracts between consumers and broadband firms are not immune
from government modification. Finally, when so much "speech" is freely
transmitted by the operators, it is hard to make a colorable claim that limits on
the right to exclude competitive commercial speech should prevail over
concerns about users' free expression.'
60
158 Id. at 2.
159 Id. at 7-8.
160 See Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
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B. "Network Neutrality" Rules: A Formal Equality Solution
1. Summary of the Network Neutrality Approach
In its purest form, "network neutrality" would arrogate the gatekeeping
function from broadband networks, rendering them a set of dumb, passive
pipes. 161 Although proposals vary, and rarely reach this far, they tend to share
two features. First, they establish a legal rule of formal equality: all applications
should be treated alike regardless of their character.' 62 Second, they advocate
implementation of this rule through rulemaking.
2. A Non-Discrimination Rule of Formal Equality
Most proposals envision a non-discrimination rule with several
exceptions. 163 Their rule requires operators to maintain a rigid baseline of "best
efforts" delivery from which they can only deviate in cases specified by
rulemaking. 164 One anticipates that the exceptions would allow for blocking
viruses but would not permit any departure from "best efforts" to mitigate
congestion by ordering the queue based on applications' demand. Returning to
the airport security line example discussed earlier in the article, such a rule
would amount to permitting the security personnel to remove dangerous
persons from the line, but prevent them from rushing the late traveler ahead of
those in line who are early for their flights. Doing so would result in the late
traveler receiving better treatment than those who arrived to the airport on time,
the kind of differential treatment which network neutrality forbids. The
problem, which should be evident at this point, is that applications possess
inherently different characteristics and while delay will hardly impact some, it
will severely limit the performance of others. A description of the
implementation of this regime in the broadband context may be useful. Online
games both contribute to congestion because they consume significant capacity
(imagine a large tour group getting into line) and when played in real-time
multi-player formats they can be very sensitive to delay (like the late
traveler). 16
5
161 Lessig has been quoted as saying that "a dumb pipe is critical." Thierer, supra note 13, at
13.
162 Lessig and Wu provided the quintessential statement of a network neutrality: "A network
that is as neutral as possible is predictable: all applications are treated alike." Letter from Tim Wu &
Lawrence Lessig to Marlene H. Dortch, supra note 17, at 3.
163 For examples of these proposals, see id. at 13; Wu, supra note 16, at 169; FCC Policy
Statement, supra note 20.
164 "Best efforts" is simply first-come, first-serve delivery which is standard without active
management by network operators.
165 If a user simply downloads the game, the application is not really time-sensitive. If,




To deal with congestion caused by the bandwidth consumption of gamers,
operators have frequently restricted such applications by instructing customers
not to use them or simply blocking their delivery. 166 Conventional network
neutrality regimes would prohibit such restrictions because they not only deny
users access to a valuable application they value, but also discourage
innovation in this area.' 67 As Lessig and Wu explain, "a carrier concerned
about bandwidth consumption [should] police bandwidth usage, not block
individual applications. Users interested in a better gaming experience would
then need to buy more bandwidth." Instead of blocking the application,
network neutrality would endorse investment in new capacity to eliminate the
congestion issue or metering users to allow usage-based pricing. In the absence
of such responses, this regime would bind operators from actively seeking to
manage applications' demand for capacity-a result which will leave
congestion unchecked but is perhaps the most cost-efficient for broadband
operators.
The acceptable responses were both discussed in Part I so only a brief
reminder is offered here. Investment in new capacity will never fully address
the problem because operators will not deploy infrastructure before demand has
clearly outstripped capacity, and in the interim, there will always be some
congestion. Furthermore, a network owner will surely pass through any capital
investment to the users. Since there is no way to properly measure various
users' consumption, all consumers will bear this charge equally. As a result, the
person emailing will not only suffer congestion effects from the online gamer
prior to new capacity, but will also then be required to subsidize the online
gamer by bearing some of the capital cost motivated solely by the gamer's use.
The second solution, usage-based pricing through metering, simply requires
exorbitant transaction costs. 16 8 To demonstrate the enormous metering costs
which usage pricing would entail for broadband, one can look to local
telephone service, which is also dominated by flat rate pricing. Studies have
indicated that the cost of usage pricing might exceed $10 billion annually in the
local telephone market.1 69 Since the Intemet involves bits of data rather than
switched calls, there is reason to believe that it would be even more expensive
to operate a metered system for broadband access.' Moreover, the installation
166 For an explanation of how a broadband carrier would do so, see, e.g., Cisco Systems, Inc.,
The Cisco Content Delivery Network Solution for the Enterprise, Cisco White Paper (April 2002),
available at http://www.cisco.com; Cosine, Inc., Digital Subscriber Lines and Managed Network-based
Services: A Perfect-and Profitable-Marriage, Cosine White Paper, available at
http://www.cosine.com.
167 See Letter from Coalition of Broadband Users and Innovators to the FCC (Nov. 18, 2002),
available at http://www.fcc.gov.
168 As Christopher Yoo points out, "the economic attractiveness of employing usage-sensitive
pricing on the Internet turns on the magnitude of the transaction costs needed to implement such a
scheme. If transaction costs are sufficiently high, it may well prove more economical to allow network
providers to pursue alternative pricing regimes." Yoo, supra note 69, at 1874.
169 Id.
170 Id. at 1875.
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costs, essentially requiring new modems for all users which tracked usage and
transmitted data back to the operator, adds to the overall expense of such a
system. When only a fraction of users and applications account for the problem,
broadband firms are unlikely to implement a full-scale overhaul in response to
network neutrality.' 71
The result of network neutrality, therefore, is to reduce the broadband
operator to a fairly passive network manager with negative consequences for
applications. Not only will time-sensitive applications be directly impaired by
congestion but innovation in such applications is likely to diminish because the
governing regime implicitly disfavors services sensitive to delay. In other
words, since email (which is time-insensitive) functions effectively in a best
efforts regime regardless of congestion while voice (which is time-sensitive)
does not, independent developers considering where to invest capital will
eschew voice applications whose performance is not easily assured. When
advocates claim that neutrality "prevent[s] distortion in the market," they
ignore the fact that it essentially substitutes one distortion for another. Although
leaving the gatekeeper to regulate itself may produce some self-interested and
inefficient behavior, the alternative also may generate non-optimal behavior-
systematically discouraging one type of application whose functionality can be
materially harmed by delay. 172 Formal equality, therefore, is not the rightprinciple to govern applications with different essential attributes.
3. Rulemaking as the Method of Implementation
Most network neutrality supporters would like to see Congress enact its
formal equality principle in a statute which delegates authority to the FCC for
enforcement of the legal rule and clarification of exceptions. Several proposals
would allow operators to restrict access for applications which interfere with
other customers' use of the network, but the meaning of such an exception in
the context of congestion is unclear. As this Article has shown, when demand
exceeds capacity on the network, each user's request for delivery of an
application (whether an email, website or voice call) essentially slows the
service for other users. Moreover, since some applications are time-sensitive,
one person's usage can totally disrupt another person's use. 173 Codifying a rule
with exceptions has two outcomes: Either there is a costly rulemaking to define
171 A variant of usage-based pricing is tiered pricing. It requires similar mechanisms for
monitoring usage and bringing enforcement actions against violators. As a result, it likely requires
transaction costs similar to usage-based systems. For a discussion of tiered pricing, see Wu, supra note
16, at 154.
172 Lessig acknowledges this flaw in the network neutrality principle and therefore pushes for
greater investments in broadband capacity. LESSIG, supra note 60, at 46-47. For another concession of
network neutrality's limits, see Letter from Tim Wu & Lawrence Lessig to Marlene H. Dortch, supra
note 17, at 3 n.3 ("Of course, it is inevitable that by its design the intemet or any communications
network will invariably create some favoritism for certain uses. Pure neutrality is more of an aspiration
than a fully achievable design principle.").
173 At certain levels of delay, a voice call simply cannot operate.
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detailed exceptions, or the exceptions consume the rule by granting wide
discretion to operators.
Section II.A.3, discussing regulatory costs, detailed the expense of
rulemaking. To review, there would be significant money spent in lobbying
legislators. Further, any notice and comment period offered by an agency
would produce direct costs associated with industry groups on all sides. In
addition, the courts would likely get involved anyway to review controversies
associated with the promulgated regulations. And finally, there may be indirect
costs since investment in applications will be skewed by the outcome of these
proceedings. If an agency promulgates a rule exempting certain applications
from the non-discrimination rule, it will send a signal to developers to avoid
investing in these applications. Even if an operator might not use its discretion
to unfairly limit such applications, the fact that those services have been singled
out is likely to distort innovation away from these areas, at least among
unaffiliated developers. 174 While rulemaking process provides clarity, it is too
inflexible an approach and far too subject to gaming by broadband operators. It
is tantamount to the airport trying to predict years in advance which travelers
should receive priority and which passengers may be efficiently delayed-an
impossible task when the context is frequently changing. A far better solution,
proposed below, would free the agency from making these decisions ex ante
and allow operators to respond to demand dynamically with a mechanism for
monitoring abuses of this power.
III. An Adjudicative Approach to Enforcing a Substantive Equality Principle
Although popular network neutrality proposals suffer from some
weaknesses, they are right to involve the state in governing access for
broadband applications. At this point, the need for regulation should be evident:
Despite the strong economic incentives pushing operators to maintain a
competitive market for applications, there are other interests that may lead them
to advantage their own services, imposing costs on consumers and chilling
innovation. Self-regulation simply ignores the likelihood that network owners
have engaged, and will continue to engage, in harmful exclusionary conduct.
There are two principal drawbacks of network neutrality proposals. First,
the underlying legal standard of neutrality, or formal equality, is flawed
because it fails to recognize the inherent differences among applications.
Without allowing differential treatment, policymakers can never fulfill their
174 An exception for WiFi attachments, for example, might simply drive innovation in this
area to the broadband operator. Just as GE would not design a toaster that an electric utility could make
non-functional, an independent WiFi developer will not invest in home networking devices if the FCC
has explicitly granted operators the right to impair their performance. In such a scenario, operators
would develop WiFi attachments because they would be unconcerned about the risk of restricted access
(they control access). Thus, users would be forced to purchase the operator's WiFi attachments since
these would be the only ones the market would supply.
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purpose of fostering level competition among applications since formal
equality effectively advantages those well-suited to a best efforts delivery
method. 175 To the extent that network neutrality proposals anticipate any
deviation from best efforts, it is only a downward departure. In other words,
they accept that harmful applications, like viruses, may require restricted
access, but do not acknowledge that time-sensitive applications require priority
to properly perform. 176 Since neutrality prohibits preferential treatment, a pay-
for-priority system "would be frowned upon,"' 77 despite its potential to
generate a more efficient ordering of congested applications.
The second flaw in network neutrality proposals is that they leave only
two modes of implementing such a rule with limited exceptions, and neither is
desirable. On the one hand, the FCC could engage in notice and comment
rulemaking to define the exceptions.' 78 As discussed earlier, such a procedure
would not only take years to accomplish, but would also likely favor the
incumbent broadband operators.' 79 The resulting rules would also have the
unfortunate effect of ossifying the market for applications, favoring
development in protected areas and discouraging investment in applications
that fall within the exceptions.' 80 On the other hand, the statute itself could
compel operators to treat all applications alike unless they obtained a permit
from the FCC, presumably through adjudication, which allows them to impose
restrictions on certain harmful services.' 8' This system would limit the
flexibility of the market, since operators would be hamstrung to make even
efficient choices for managing the network without first obtaining permission.
An alternative model is available that combines a more precise congressional
rule of law with agency adjudication of anti-competitive conduct.
175 Although network neutrality proponents do not often frame their regimes as "best efforts,"
it is tautological that only best efforts meets their standard. Any preference or discrimination would both
violate neutrality and represent a divergence from best efforts.
176 Wu states his general principle as follows: "[A]bsent evidence of harm to the local
network or the interests of other users, broadband carriers should not discriminate in how they treat
traffic on their broadband network on the basis of inter-network criteria." Wu, supra note 16, at 168. It is
worth noting that Wu earlier admits that "[n]eutrality, as a concept.., depends entirely on what set of
subjects you choose to be neutral among." Id. at 147-48.
177 Id. at 168.
178 Wu seems to acknowledge this possibility but implies that he recognizes its costs when he
writes, "[the regime depends on] a proposed antidiscrimination principle (a rule, only if necessary)." Id.
at 165.
179 In discussing problems created by broad standards, such as network neutrality, Judge
Henry Friendly noted that "lack of definite standards creates a void into which attempts to influence are
bound to rush." Henry J. Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need for Better
Definitions of Standards, 75 HARv. L. REv. 863, 881 (1962).
180 Of course, the idea of the FCC shaping the market for applications is only problematic if
you accept that the powers of the agency to predict which applications will be valuable to consumers are
not as robust as those of the free market.
181 Wu's concept of imposing a baseline forbidding operators from restricting access for
applications "absent a showing of harm" seems to suggest a licensing scheme where operators could
obtain the FCC's permission to block harmful applications. Wu, supra note 16, at 165. Under the
Administrative Procedure Act, licensing occurs through adjudication. Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. § 551 (2000).
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A. A New Legal Standard to Govern Access for Applications
At the core of this approach is a non-discrimination rule that seeks
substantive equality for applications. Although best efforts delivery (i.e., first-
come, first-serve) remains the baseline, this new legal rule permits the operator
to depart from this baseline where it is efficient to do so. By contrast, network
neutrality requires strict adherence to this baseline with limited, pre-determined
exceptions.
An example may help to demonstrate the functional benefits of a
substantive equality method. Real-time video conferencing is sensitive to delay
unlike other communication applications, such as email. Network neutrality
would require packets for a video conferencing application to line up as they
arrive, even after email packets. In the absence of congestion, this delay might
be insignificant, but at times of peak usage significant delay could disable the
conferencing application (imagine a static figure on screen). A regime
governed by substantive equality overcomes this problem by allowing
operators to prioritize the video packets over the email, deviating from the best
efforts baseline to allow each application to operate properly. Although the
email may arrive later under this approach, the user is unlikely to notice the
difference. Such differential treatment preserves continued performance of both
applications, achieving greater efficiency and fairness. By contrast, the neutral
regime forces a false choice among communication applications-email
appears better in any situation if video does not work.
B. A Hybrid Model of Administrative Procedure
The regime advanced by this Article also entails a different form of
administrative procedure than that offered by network neutrality supporters.
Rather than using FCC rulemaking to clarify a broad neutrality standard, this
model contemplates Congress instructing the agency to enforce the substantive
equality principle through adjudication, supplemented by disclosure rules
developed through rulemaking. The statute would grant the Commission initial
jurisdiction over complaints, allowing federal courts to review the decisions,
and provide some direction to judges by including a two-factor test that may
determine whether the plaintiff is entitled to a presumption of harm that the
operator must rebut. Specifically, if the plaintiff proves the operator possessed
market power and failed to use a fair method for choosing how to treat a certain
application, the operator must provide factual evidence to show its choice
actually achieved substantive equality for applications. Although judges might
elaborate these factors, the test is sufficiently precise to bring predictability to
the question of whether certain treatment violates the legal standard.
This hybrid form combines clarity and flexibility in a way better suited to
the problem of governing broadband access than a more pure procedural
method. Scholars and policymakers have long noted the importance of
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providing definite legal standards.' 82 A legal rule expressed by Congress, and
enforced through a "directed" 183 adjudication, provides such clarity: Operators
are put on notice of the objective (a level playing field for applications to
compete for end users) and permissible means (a best efforts baseline with the
discretion to depart from best efforts where it better serves the objective). Such
a standard is certainly more definite than many past delegations of power to the
FCC. 184 And its location in a statute rather than a regulation not only protects
the formulation of the standard from industry manipulation, but also affords it
greater preemptive force.1
85
While this Article's approach primarily employs adjudication to
implement the legal standard, there remains a significant role for rulemaking.
First, Congress should direct the FCC to issue disclosure rules regarding the
network management choices made by operators.' 86 Mechanically, any IP
address receiving non-"best efforts" treatment, either priority or restricted
access, would be filed for public viewing. Such a system permits the FCC,
application developers and even end users to monitor behavior. Broadband
firms are less likely to engage in harmful conduct if they must make such
choices public. The FCC would maintain discretion over the design of such
disclosure. Many questions would need to be answered, including how such
filings should occur, how long operators must maintain that treatment and what
penalties should be imposed for non-disclosure. The FCC's expertise and
ability to seek industry comment through the rulemaking process makes it well-
suited to develop such a scheme, which is consistent with past filing
mechanisms for rate regulation and infrastructure sharing.1
87
182 See Friendly, supra note 179. Also, in conversation with the author, former FCC Chair
Reed Hundt noted that definite standards (usually through rulemaking) are necessary to influence the
strategic planning of businesses-they do not respond to vague pronouncements. Interview with Reed
Hundt, supra note 121.
183 "Directed" is meant to refer to the inclusion of a two-factor test in the statute.
184 The preamble to the 1996 Telecom Act states that the law's purpose is "[t]o promote
competition and reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher quality services for
American telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new
telecommunications technologies." Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 609 (2000).
185 Administrative law scholars have frequently pointed out that agencies are more vulnerable
to capture than Congress because there are simply fewer people at an agency that one must influence to
produce a certain outcome. Although agency regulations are accorded significant deference under the
Chevron doctrine and may preempt state oversight in the area, courts are more respectful of
congressional statements. The Court demonstrated such regard in Chevron by announcing that the
threshold question for reviewing regulation is "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue." Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
Although no canon of law appears to require Congress to specify a standard, courts are more likely to
inquire into legislative intent where important policy choices are made. See FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
186 Congress could, of course, issue such rules itself. They would require no greater level of
specificity than do income tax provisions, but the legislature's docket is too full to issue every rule and
the FCC does maintain some expertise that would be useful here.
187 This scheme is analogous to the tariff filing responsibilities imposed by Section 203 of the
Communications Act of 1934, which the Supreme Court upheld as an essential feature of the regulatory
framework. See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2000); MCI Telecomm. v. AT&T, 512
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There are further roles for FCC rulemaking that would help facilitate a
substantive equality regime for broadband access without undermining the
flexibility of the market. For example, Congress may empower the agency to
fill in ambiguities about adjudication. Although the two-factor test described
below will direct the resolution of adjudication, it does not speak to procedural
matters, such as whether an arbitration system should be utilized or what statute
of limitations should apply. Rulemaking would be appropriate for all of these
functions.
The use of adjudication rather than rulemaking as the primary mechanism
for implementing the statute attempts to "give the marketplace more freedom to
evolve."' 188 In the ever-changing landscape of broadband applications, it would
be impossible for an agency to fashion precise rules regarding what treatment is
proper for specific applications.1 89 In concert with disclosure rules, the FCC
could police conduct that appeared anti-competitive, as the FTC does, or serve
as a forum for private parties to bring challenges. 190 Through case-by-case
adjudication, the FCC and courts could elaborate the legal standard and provide
greater clarity about access for broadband applications.' 91
Frequent criticisms have been levied against the administrative choice of
adjudication. Most concern its backward-looking perspective and its focus on a
particular controversy rather than on a generally applicable rule. Further
criticisms highlight the cost of fleshing out a principle through multiple
proceedings rather than a one-time rulemaking. The benefits of adjudication in
this context overcome these worries. First, while the Administrative Procedure
Act defines rulemaking as an agency's statement for "future effect,"', 92 judicial
orders may also have prospective consequences, even if they upset prior
expectations about the policy.' 93 Second, the model proposed here does not
eschew a clear legal standard. It simply encourages Congress to issue that
U.S. 218, 231 (1994). Writing the majority opinion, Justice Scalia noted that "[r]ate filings are, in fact,
the essential characteristic of a rate-regulated industry." 512 U.S. at 23 1. Another useful comparison is
the requirement to file infrastructure sharing rates imposed by the 1996 Telecom Act. See
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 259(b)(7) (2000).
188 Weiser, supra note 119, at 76.
189 As David Shapiro stated, "[tlhere are numerous situations in which the only course that is
consistent with the legislative purpose is to apply the statute to the facts without attempting to articulate
more precise rules governing the applicability of the standard." David L. Shapiro, The Choice of
Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REv. 921, 928
(1965).
190 This antitrust-like model resembles the approach endorsed by Professor Philip Weiser but
differs in two important respects. First, Weiser embraces a broad nondiscrimination standard without
distinguishing between formal and substantive equality. Weiser, supra note 119, at 75. Second, Weiser
puts off an attempt to provide detail for his regime. Weiser, supra note 119, at 76 n. 15 1.
191 The Chevron doctrine would also apply to such statutory interpretation that occurs
through adjudication. See, e.g., I.N.S. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (1999).
192 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2000).
193 Shapiro, supra note 189, at 935 (stating that "the most that can be said" of the prospective
nature of rulemakings versus adjudication "is that a rule declared in a regulation is more likely than a
rule declared in adjudication to be limited in application to determining the legal status of future
conduct, although either may operate to defeat expectations justifiably based on prior policy").
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standard rather than delegating such power to an agency. Thus, anxiety that
market participants will not be able to plan in response to this regulation is
misplaced. 194 Finally, while adjudication requires evidentiary proceedings,
rulemaking might prove just as expensive. Not only might the process for
narrowing a vague standard like "network neutrality" require years of work, but
ensuring compliance will likely beget litigation. As Professor David Shapiro
points out, "the issuance of a regulation does not guarantee its effectiveness; it
may well be necessary to bring individual violators to book by commencing
adjudicatory proceedings against them while others are complying with the
law."
1 95
C. The Two-Factor Test: Primary Market Competition and an Efficient
Selection Process
Since adjudication may not provide the market with the same clarity as
rulemaking, it is important to provide some direction for firms about what kind
of treatment is legitimate under this regime. To this end, the proposed statute
would offer a burden-shifting approach for judging complaints.1 96 Judges
reviewing complaints must ask two questions: Does the operator possess
significant market power? And was the operator's choice of treatment fair? If
the plaintiff can demonstrate that the operator possesses market power and did
not employ a "fair choice" method, the judge will presume harm that an
operator can only rebut with evidence that its choice achieved substantive
equality. The negative inference is that differential treatment will be considered
presumptively legal if the operator possesses no market power (allowing users
to switch providers) or if it determines treatment of applications efficiently.' 
97
194 A concise version of this criticism can be seen in Shapiro, supra note 189, at 940, when
he writes that "[r]ulemaking provides accessibility and clarity of formulation whereas adjudication may
be opaque for those who are not initiated into "the mysteries of a particular agency and its works." See
also LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 173 (1964) (stating that any attempt to accomplish
economic management through adjudication is certain to result in "inefficiency, hypocrisy, moral
confusion, and frustration").
195 Shapiro, supra note 189, at 936. One can imagine countless examples, especially in the
case of network neutrality proposals, that provide exceptions for operators to restrict access to
applications harmful to the network or other users. As this Article discussed earlier, almost any
application harms other users in the presence of congestion because it slows their service. Would
broadband firms receive blanket protection to restrict applications in this context? This would cut
against the entire network neutral approach, but resolving which applications may be restricted because
they really harm other users or the network could require many adjudicatory hearings.
196 Philip Weiser suggested a blanket presumption that differential treatment was anti-
competitive, which the operator may rebut with a legitimate business reason. Weiser, supra note 119, at
76. The problem with this approach is that it will overburden operators if strongly enforced because they
will need to provide case-specific justifications for each network decision, and it will fail to adequately
restrict operators if satisfied with almost any business purpose.
197 Importantly, the law does not presume anti-competitive conduct simply because the
operator's affiliated application has gained a dominant share of the market. Professor Clay Christensen
has persuasively shown that there are times when an integrated solution is simply better than a modular
approach, and the law should not disrupt a system that serves users well so long as fair means were used
to obtain that position. CHRISTENSEN & RAYNOR, supra note 88, at 125-35.
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The first factor, the existence of "market power," instructs courts to look
at the operator's position in the market relative to end users.' 98 Consumers do
not require government assistance to punish a network owner for
discriminatory conduct if they can switch broadband providers easily. 99 Judges
are capable of designing the proper standard for market power. Indeed, antitrust
analysis, including the HHI indexing method discussed in Part I, may offer a
useful guide, although judges should not be constrained by standards drawn
from other contexts. If the plaintiff fails to show that the operator possesses
"market power," the court should presume the conduct was efficient and end
the matter unless the plaintiff can produce compelling facts to the contrary.
200
Upon resolving this threshold question, a reviewing body should move to
the "fair choice" factor. Under this model, the operator gets to choose how to
treat each application, i.e., whether to prioritize delivery, restrict delivery, or
leave it at best efforts. In its complaint, the plaintiff should identify which
specific network decision it deemed unfair so that the court may review the
process underlying that choice. 201 If the operator can defend the fairness of its
treatment, it will avoid a presumption of harm. If the operator cannot
demonstrate "fair choice," it must overcome the presumption, unless it lacks
market power.
The "fair choice" factor will typically assess how an operator allocated
priority slots. Recalling the airport security line example, there are unlikely to
be charges of unfair conduct if (a) no one is advanced in line or (b) a passenger
is denied access entirely. The absence of any priority slots could violate
substantive equality, but in the absence of a network neutrality requirement
operators will likely manage their network by providing some applications with
priority. 202 The presence of disclosure rules reduces the likelihood that
operators will depart downward from "best efforts" unless the application
clearly harms other users, e.g., a virus.
198 Market power is measured in relation to end users rather than applications to reflect the
local geographic perspective of this market analysis. Even critics of broadband regulation appear to
implicitly accept its relevance in the presence of market power. Professors Owen and Rosston wrote that
"the benefit (if any) of regulation of [local broadband] service is the potential consumer welfare gains
from reducing the distortions caused by monopoly power." Owen & Rosston, supra note 3, at 30.
199 Switching costs also impact this issue. While this Article does not fully explore the effect
of these costs, it is important to recognize that any judge must evaluate whether an operator has
established substantial barriers to exit such that a consumer has limited power to respond to
discriminatory behavior in network management. For my purposes, let us assume that switching costs
are minimal and that the presence of multiple broadband providers is sufficient for resolving the
question of whether an operator has market power.
200 While this Article does not explore the type of facts a plaintiff might present to overcome
the presumption of efficient conduct, one can imagine that a grossly unfair choice of treatment, such as
restricting access to any application that competes with the operator's proprietary services, would
constitute a violation of substantive equality.
201 Since differential treatment must be disclosed, it is safe to assume that this requirement
does not impose a significant burden on plaintiffs. Indeed, if non-disclosure of exclusionary conduct can
be shown, the FCC should take additional actions.
202 Even if the operator does not provide an affiliated service with priority, the denial of any
priority slots may relate to preserving a legacy service.
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Pricing is likely to affect allocations of priority slots, and how pricing is
conducted will weigh on judges evaluating the "fair choice" factor.203 Today,
network operators tend not to charge applications for access, managing all
unaffiliated services under best efforts and, in some instances, granting their
own applications priority. Leading broadband companies have suggested they
will soon sell these priority slots.2°4 Despite critics' contentions that selling
priority is "double-charging" 205 or will stifle innovation, 206 there is nothing
intrinsically wrong with this choice. Pricing can bring some transparency to the
cost of access which will allow developers to better evaluate the risks of
developing certain applications. 207 It is similar to a traveler who considers
whether to pay for business class service to ensure priority in the security line.
Indeed, it may actually increase applications' willingness to participate on the
network if broadband providers better attend to their needs in order to gain208
revenue. Certainly, the airport security line would care far less about
advancing time-sensitive travelers if it were forbidden from charging for this
service, either ad hoc or through another tier of service. Thus, a "pay for
priority" system seems inevitable, especially if congestion persists, and this
Article assumes both that it will develop and that it is normatively desirable if
conducted fairly.
Many mechanisms exist for pricing priority slots. 20 9 Network operators
could research demand and then post prices, as retailers do. 2  They could alsoengage in negotiations with major application developers for priority slots,
203 See Owen & Rosston, supra note 3, at 14.
204 See generally Patricia O'Connell, At SBC, It's All About 'Scale and Scope', BW ONLINE,
Nov. 7, 2005 (Ed Whitacre, CEO of SBC, noted that, "we and the cable companies have made an
investment and for a Google or Yahoo! or Vonage or anybody to expect to use these pipes [for] free is
nuts!"); Adam L. Penenberg, Internet Freeloaders: Should Google Have to Pay for the Bandwidth it
Consumes?, SLATE, Jan. 17, 2006, http://www.slate.com/Id/2134397/ (Ivan Seidenberg, CEO of
Verizon, explained that "[w]e have to make sure that [application providers] don't sit on our network
and chew up bandwidth. We need to pay for the pipe.").
205 See Randall Stross, Hey, Baby Bells: Information Still Wants to Be Free, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
15, 2006, at C3.
206 See Penenberg, supra note 204.
207 If developers of time-sensitive applications have great uncertainty about whether they will
be able to gain priority access to consumers, necessary for their product's functionality, they may be
discouraged from developing the applications in the first place.
208 Since a two-sided network requires the platform operator to attract both sets of distinct
users, re-focusing broadband companies on their dual customer base may leverage network effects in a
way that promotes universal broadband better.
209 For the purposes of this Article, I assume that network operators would only price a
limited amount of slots and that content that did not obtain one of those slots would queue in the
traditional "best efforts" approach. It is not clear exactly how many priority positions each operator
might offer for sale, but that number should not change the basic analytic framework proposed here.
210 Mechanically, an operator would advertise that high-performance downloads would cost
SX per user, per unit of data transmitted. In theory, any web provider could pay the fee, and the
broadband operator would ensure that their data packets received priority. Presumably, the web provider
would pass some of that charge through to the end user, although if they operated on an advertising
model, as many original Web companies did, they might absorb the "pay for priority" charge in order to
maintain their user base.
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which BellSouth has already begun exploring.2 11 Finally, network operators
could conduct online auctions of positions on their network. Auctions are
probably the most fair and efficient method of allocating slots. 2 12 Whereas
negotiated pricing will favor large application providers2 13 and tends to operate
best where both parties have full information, 2 14 auctions are far more inclusive
and are especially effective in discovering the efficient price amid information
asymmetries. 2 1 There is even reason to believe that concentrated players are
corruptible-likely to select other large players for priority slots who may pay
less but advantage the broadband company in other ways.2 16 Bilateral
monopolies between large broadband firms and large application companies
may result, which could both increase costs for users and stifle innovation.
217
The purpose of directing adjudication through a two-factor test is not to
engineer an answer for every situation, but simply to provide participants with
greater clarity about how conduct will be evaluated so that they can plan
accordingly. An FCC policy guideline might add further predictability by
indicating an acceptance of auctions as a "fair choice" method.2 18 Although
pricing systems are not yet established, considerable evidence indicates that
they will arrive soon. A policy guideline favoring auctions might influence
operators to employ this method rather than less efficient mechanisms, like
211 See Dionne Searcey & Amy Schatz, Phone Companies Set Off a Battle Over Internet
Fees, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2006, at Al. Describing BellSouth's idea to seek a small percentage of the fee
that Movielink.com charges for movie downloads in exchange for faster delivery, BellSouth's chief
technology officer noted that "the application [consumers] want requires performance, and we'll make
that available [for a fee]." Id.
212 Much of the discussion of auctions is based on PAUL KLEMPERER, AUCTIONS: THEORY
AND PRACTICE (2004). Eric Budish, a doctoral candidate in Harvard's Business Economics program,
also provided many helpful comments on this section.
213 The high transaction costs involved in negotiated pricing are also likely to favor large
applications. It is far easier for Comcast, for example, to simply approach Yahoo!, Microsoft, and
Apple's iTunes, than to identify the niche sports programming website that has a strong demand for
priority delivery.
214 See MAX BAZERMAN & MARGARET NEALE, NEGOTIATING RATIONALLY (1992).
215 The heterogeneous nature and sheer number of applications make it impossible for an
operator to have full information regarding the economics of possible customers and their willingness to
pay for priority.
216 IPO underwriting provides an example of the corruptive nature of negotiated pricing.
Investment banks have frequently been accused of pricing offerings at levels that provide large
institutional buyers with first day price appreciation, even at the expense of the issuer's proceeds. This
occurs largely because the institutional buyers are significant repeat customers of the bank whereas the
issuer is often a less frequent client. Auctions, by contrast, allow investors other than Wall Street
insiders to bid on shares, and this was one of the motivating factors behind Google's choice to issue its
IPO shares this way. See Joe Nocera, Open and Fair: Why Wall St. Hates Auctions, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
18, 2006, at C .
217 Bilateral monopolies of the kind described here would amount to a vertical relation
between dominant players in two parts of the value chain. SBC and Yahoo! could have structured their
agreement this way so that alternative search engines would have been blocked or restricted from
accessing SBC customers.
218 Posted pricing, for example, may not adequately discover demand, but it saves the
operator from the corruptibility of negotiations and provides transparency to application developers.
Thus, a court could only deem such a method unfair if the plaintiff could show the prices were set to
unfairly exclude certain services.
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negotiations or posted pricing. 219 Ultimately, judges must decide how best to
implement the statute. While the two-factor test seeks to cabin their
interpretations of substantively equal treatment for broadband applications, it
does not presume to anticipate all the complexity that the market will present.
D. The Proposed Statute and Its Applications:
Congress might endorse an alternative principle and procedure through a
statute similar to the following:
§_ Promoting Equal Access for Broadband Applications
Broadband Applications have the right to an equal opportunity to access
Broadband Users, so long as their performance does not unreasonably harm
other Broadband Applications. Accordingly, Broadband Operators shall treat all
Broadband Applications alike unless differential treatment better serves the
purpose of this Act. To accomplish this goal of substantive equality for all
Broadband Applications:
The Commission shall prescribe, within one year after the date of
enactment of this Act, regulations requiring Broadband Operators to
publicly file any differential treatment imposed on a Broadband
Application, including the relevant IP address and type of arrangement
showing the rates, terms and conditions of treatment.
To aid in enforcement of this section, the Commission shall hear complaints
regarding violations of this Act. The Commission shall presume that any
differential treatment is anti-competitive and contrary to the purpose of this Act,
if:
The Broadband Operator possesses market power over end users, and
The Broadband Operator has not used an open and fair process for
setting access terms, including pricing.
As used in this section,
"Broadband Applications" includes any IP-based service or content
provider, which may possess different essential characteristics,
particularly related to their performance in congested networks;
"Broadband Users" means residential and business customers of a
Broadband Operator;
"Broadband Operator" means a service provider that offers high-speed
connections to the Internet using whatever technology, including but not
219 Evaluating "fair choice" in the absence of a pricing system will likely require a fact-
intensive inquiry into the operator's determination to treat an application in a specific manner.
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Substantive Equality
limited to cable networks, telephone networks electricity networks, fiber
optic connections, and wireless transmission;226
"Commission" means the Federal Communications Commission.
This law expresses the substantive equality principle, maintains freedom
for broadband firms to manage their network consistent with this principle, and
provides parties with a mechanism to enforce the statute against violations.
This approach enjoys several economic advantages over network neutrality
proposals as well as operating within the constitutional constraints discussed
earlier. First, it does not impose rigid rules on operators, but rather allows them
to manage their network freely in order to optimize capacity by matching their
supply of priority access with demand identified among applications.
Consequently, the network owner can minimize the harmful externalities of
congestion while leveraging the two-sided network effect in order to maximize
the value of its broadband platform. The indirect result should be greater
investment in infrastructure by the operators and more innovation by
application providers who are able to identify the cost of obtaining priority
access by reviewing public filings and thus better plan their development. Since
the model requires no physical invasion, such as compelled line-sharing, to
manage the gatekeeping power of operators, it does not implicate the Fifth
Amendment's Takings Clause. Finally, although network owners can block
access to certain harmful applications, the discussion below should make clear
that any viewpoint-based restrictions would clearly violate the statute's
principle of substantive equality for broadband applications. And the speaking
rights of the operator itself, as explained in Part I, are unlikely to outweigh the
interests of the community in maintaining this forum for expression.
A focus on four paradigmatic harms posed by operators' gatekeeping
power may help illustrate the utility of this law. The problems considered are:
(1) restricting access for applications that compete with legacy services (the
Madison River issue), (2) prioritizing affiliated applications over unaffiliated
services (the "proprietary VoIP" issue), (3) creating an exclusionary bilateral
monopoly with an independent provider (the "SBC-Yahoo!" issue) and (4)
blocking objectionable content (the "free speech versus virus" issue).
First, there are many legacy services, primarily voice service and cable
TV, which broadband operators may seek to protect by degrading the quality of
broadband substitutes traveling over their networks. As an initial measure, the
law proposed in this Article would require an operator like Madison River to
disclose any limitations it places on delivery of data from IP addresses,
including that of Vonage. The application provider could proactively search
such listings to identify restricted access or it could simply follow-up on
220 Adapted from the definition provided in Wu, supra note 16, at 170.
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complaints by users.221 The law provides a private right of action for Vonage to
challenge restrictions imposed by Madison River through whatever
adjudicative process the FCC develops for such matters. The judge would
determine whether Madison River has market power over users, which it likely
does, and evaluate the fairness of its method for deciding which applications
should receive differential treatment. Absent a finding of no market power over
users or a fair method for deciding to restrict Vonage's access, the judge would
impose a presumption against Madison River's conduct. Unless Madison River
could meet its burden of proving that its denial of access for Vonage achieved
the purposes of the statute, it would be ordered remove the restriction and pay
some compensatory damages to Vonage, possibly along with a punitive
222award.
Although, the Madison River case quite obviously violates the standard,
one can imagine a more difficult case where the company had simply slowed
the Vonage service without restricting it, or merely failed to provide any
prioritization system for independent VoIP services. Assuming that Madison
River has a monopoly over broadband in its local market, almost any restriction
of a non-harmful application, like VoIP, would constitute a violation of the
proposed law. In addition, even the absence of a prioritization scheme might
violate the statute since Vonage could make the case that differential treatment
was necessary for its application to have equal access to users (recall that delay
can impair the performance of Vonage's service). Since no differential
treatment exists, it is impossible for Madison River to meet the second factor
(an "open and fair process for setting access terms") and thus Vonage would
experience presumption in its favor if Madison River had market power. If
Vonage prevailed, Madison River would likely be forced to develop a scheme
to satisfy the obligations of the law.
2 2 3
The second common problem arises when the operator has developed its
own broadband application and seeks to use its power as the gatekeeper to
unfairly compete with independent services. This case may be understood as
the "proprietary VoIP" issue because most of the cable and DSL providers are
currently marketing their own VoIP products to compete with unaffiliated
companies, like Vonage. There are two ways that a broadband firm might seek
to gain an advantage over competitors' services. First, it could slow the third-
221 Since the filings would be public, a user could search the listings herself if she was able to
obtain the IP address of her application service provider. Of course, it is more likely that she would
contact the service provider directly and allow them to handle the situation since they could spread the
costs of resolving the problem over all other users similarly afflicted.
222 The presumption of harm is not dispositive. Madison River could still prevail by showing
that Vonage's application severely harmed other applications and the only way to achieve a level
playing field for all applications would be to remove the Vonage application. Again, such a defense is
equivalent to the airport security officer simply removing the dangerous passenger from the line.
223 It is important to remember that such obligations can be satisfied by charging applications
for priority positions and therefore "liability" in this case may increase value for the broadband network,




party product. As with the Madison River case, the disclosure that an operator
had departed negatively from the best efforts baseline in its treatment of a
competitive service would invoke scrutiny from the FCC and the service
provider itself. And any application that suffers from such mistreatment would
have confidence that the FCC would declare such conduct illegal under this
law. Alternatively, an operator could maintain the baseline delivery of data
from the independent VolP provider and grant its proprietary service the only
priority slot on the network. The effect to users would be the same-namely,
they would perceive the proprietary service to be higher quality because it
received priority delivery even if the independent product might be better.
Certainly, such treatment would not satisfy the statute's stated purpose to grant
each application an "equal opportunity to access" users. Moreover, upon
review, the operator would surely fail the second factor since its method of
allocating priority was hardly "open and fair."
The third situation is essentially a variant on the second. As discussed
earlier, vertical relations may occur through both integration of two levels of
the value chain into one firm or through bilateral agreements between two firms
in separate levels. When such an agreement between a network owner and an
application provider restricts other access to the network for other applications,
it poses some of the same problems as an operator unfairly competing with its
own application. The "SBC-Yahoo!" designation is not meant to suggest that
the well-known partnership between those companies created such a
relationship but it is a useful construct through which to discuss potential harm.
Imagine if that deal had provided that SBC would only favor Yahoo!'s services
over competing search, email, and music services, among others. Although the
"hands off' camp would argue the economic incentives, principally lost
opportunities from network effects, would always militate against such conduct
by SBC it is possible that SBC might agree if Yahoo!'s offer looked very
attractive.
To implement such an agreement, SBC might either slow IP addresses of
competing applications or grant Yahoo! an exclusive priority slot on its
network. Both behaviors strongly resemble the situation in the "proprietary
VoIP" example. In each case, customers would perceive the value of non-
Yahoo! services to be inferior, regardless of their actual performance under
controlled conditions, and developers would be leery of investing in innovation
that might compete with Yahoo! because its access to SBC's users would be
compromised. Disclosure would allow third-parties to identify the
implementation of this arrangement-either their IP addresses had been singled
out for less than "best efforts" delivery or Yahoo!'s IP address had been chosen
for better than "best efforts" delivery. With such evidence in hand, developers
or the FCC itself could initiate a proceeding to determine whether SBC's
conduct was anti-competitive. Assuming that SBC has market power over its
consumers, a judge would review the process by which Yahoo! was chosen to
receive preferential treatment. A purely negotiated arrangement is likely to fail
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this factor and force SBC to bear the burden of proving its treatment of Yahoo!
served the goal of substantive equality for broadband applications. Although a
judge might accept the fairness of a private auction, similar to what bankers
conduct for asset sales, it is not as likely to pass muster as if SBC had simply
posted prices for priority slots or conducted a more public auction (either online
or where bidders' identities were concealed).224
The outcome at this stage is perhaps not as important as the mechanism
created by the law. Through this mechanism, application developers are
provided with some predictability that they will be able to obtain equal access
on the network and operators are put on notice that they cannot engage in
exclusionary vertical relations at the expense of customers. Yahoo! may end up
purchasing a priority slot on SBC's network which gives it an advantage
relative to competitors, but this poses no legal or economic problem as long as
other applications were able to bid on the same slot. Thus, if Yahoo! obtains the
slot, it reflects its greater demand for the position and presumably the greater
value it believes it can create with priority than its competitors.
Finally, there remains the threat that broadband firms will use their power
as gatekeepers to block objectionable applications. As previously discussed,
consumer welfare increases when operators block harmful applications, like
viruses, because then users need not purchase protection systems individually,
but social welfare is impaired when network managers restrict content they
dislike and effectively attack freedom of expression. Distinguishing between
these two forms of conduct by broadband companies requires judges to
interpret "unreasonable harm to other Broadband Applications" in a way that
permits denying access to viruses but not to unsavory speech. Although the
reference to applications rather than users should allow such an interpretation
(nasty words are no different in binary code than nice ones), the FCC may seek
to issue a policy guideline to this effect. Ultimately, the goal of fair and
efficient broadband networks must induce operators to maintain open platforms




The goal of any broadband policy must be to promote both deployment of
the infrastructure and development of applications. The most efficient way to
accomplish this goal is to leverage network effects: encouraging more
applications which drive user demand and in turn fuel investment in
224 The problem with a private auction is that it is susceptible to the power of bilateral
monopolies; in other words, big companies in separate parts of the value chain joining forces at the
expense of consumers. This is less likely in an unlimited auction.
225 Of course, this issue may never arise because virus developers are unlikely to challenge




applications. The increased value of the broadband platform will provide an
incentive for owners to deploy further infrastructure and for competitive
technologies, such as BPL and wireless, to enter the market.
Current broadband firms threaten this vision because they can use their
power as gatekeepers to advantage their own applications and legacy services
at the expense of innovation among thousands of independent developers. The
Madison River case demonstrates the impact to consumer welfare of leaving
this power unchecked. Consumers will face higher costs, and investors in
applications will be chilled. The emergence of broadband services as
substitutes for existing technologies, and their reliance on priority slots for
adequate performance amid congestion, heightens the need to address the
gatekeeping role of operators.
Although network neutrality is an intuitively appealing concept, it is the
wrong policy. Equal access for broadband applications is the ultimate objective
and, in the context of a congested network, such equality can only be obtained
through differential treatment. The formal equality principle motivating
network neutrality proposals implicitly disfavors time-sensitive applications.
Furthermore, the role of government cannot be to issue specific rules about
how to manage networks because such an exercise is futile and potentially
harmful to the market's development. No one can expect an agency to
accurately predict which applications will arise in the future and rigid rules may
ossify the market in favor of certain applications, discouraging investment in
others. Moreover, the rulemaking process is more subject to industry capture
and hold-up than a legal standard codified through a statute and enforced by
adjudication.
The most recent staff draft of legislation released by the House Commerce
Committee endorses an adjudication method of enforcement but adopts the
227
wrong principle. Specifically, Title II of the proposed bill would give the
FCC authority to enforce the principles it articulated in 2005, which expressly
sought networks operated in a "neutral manner." 228 The principles themselves
are very vague and do not address the key problem of network owners
discriminating against unaffiliated applications. Furthermore, the draft
229
expressly limits the FCC's authority over the matter to adjudication,
preventing even the issuance of disclosure rules. Finally, the text grants the
Commission "exclusive authority to adjudicate any complaint alleging a
226 Subsidies for the infrastructure do not produce the same result. Broadband will have little
value without applications because a fiber optic line to the house creates no value on its own.
227 See Third Staff Draft of Telecom Act of 2006, 109th Cong. (2006), available at
http://static.publicknowledge.org/pdf/20060327-house-telecom-print.pdf.
228 See FCC, supra note 20.
229 Third Staff Draft of Telecom Act of 2006, supra note 227, §715(b)(1) (2006) ("The
Commission's authority to enforce the broadband policy statement ... is limited to the adjudicatory
authority.., and the Commission shall not have rulemaking authority with respect to such
enforcement.").
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violation,' 23° which some parties have interpreted to deny judicial review by
federal courts. Thus, this law simply emboldens the gatekeepers to exclude
whatever they desire, whenever they desire. Not only will it be difficult to track
such discriminatory treatment in the absence of disclosure rules, but the legal
principles and mechanisms articulated are also inadequate for proper
enforcement.
The purpose of this Article is to highlight the harm and suggest an
alternative path. The initial view is that our nation needs robust innovation of
applications with the least intrusive regulation possible. We can rely neither on
self-regulation by powerful and self-interested gatekeepers nor on a costly
rulemaking process that ignores the dynamism of the market. Furthermore, any
regime must accept that applications have inherent differences that make a rigid
baseline unworkable. A deeper discussion is required in order to formulate the
precise policy, but two points should be clear. Differential treatment must be
part of the solution, and predictions of an agency cannot substitute for the
workings of the market. Ignoring these signposts will relegate the United States
to continued decline in the levels of broadband participation, a fate that could
have serious effects on our economy and social welfare.
230 Id. at §715(b)(2).
231 Public Knowledge, House Draft Telecom Bill Has Weak Net Neutrality Provisions (Mar.
31, 2006), http://www.publicknowledge.org/news/intheknow/itk-2006033 1.
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